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THE STATE OF THE SPECIAL VERDICT-1979
JACK POPE* AND WILLIAM G. LOWERRE**
Approximately six years ago, effective September 1, 1973, the
Texas Supreme Court, by its revision of rule 277 of the Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure,' substantially revised the Texas system for submission of a case to the jury in civil trials.2 The new rule eliminated
the earlier requirement that issues must be submitted distinctly and
separately. Instead, the trial judge was given discretion to determine whether to submit issues broadly. It would no longer "be
objectionable that a question is general or includes a combination
of elements or issues." 3 In addition, inferential rebuttal issues would
no longer be proper questions to propound to jurors. The trial judge
was authorized to submit such explanatory instructions as shall be
"proper," rather than those that were deemed "necessary." 4 The
new rule had been promulgated so that its effective date would
coincide with Texas' adoption of comparative negligence.' The revisions were designed to correct many of the trial and jury problems,
* B.A., Abilene Christian University; LL.B., University of Texas; Associate Justice,
Supreme Court of Texas.
** B.A., Trinity University; J.D., University of Texas; Associate, Foreman, Dyess, Prew-

ett, Rosenberg & Henderson, Houston, Texas.
1. TEx. R. Civ. P. 277.
2. See Gonzales v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 511 F.2d 629, 632 (5th Cir. 1975). See generally
Cadena, Comparative Negligence and the Special Verdict, 5 ST. MAv's L.J. 688 (1974);
Figari, Texas Civil Procedure,Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 248, 258-61 (1974);
Pope, A New Start on the Special Verdict, 37 TEx. B.J. 335 (1974); Pope & Lowerre, Revised
Rule 277-A Better Special Verdict System for Texas, 27 Sw. L.J. 577 (1973).
3. TEx. R. Civ. P. 277. See generally Pope & Lowerre, Revised Rule 277-A Better
Special Verdict System for Texas, 27 Sw. L.J. 577, 580-82 (1973).
4. TEx. R. Civ. P. 277; see Figari, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
28 Sw. L.J. 248, 259 (1974). Compare TEx. R. Civ. P. 277 with Tex. R. Civ. P. 277 (1969).
5. See generally TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1978).
6. In December 1969, the Texas State Bar Committee on Substantive Law and Advancements conducted a poll of Texas district judges inquiring into certain areas of tort law. A large
number of those judges responding took time to comment on their dissatisfaction with the
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that had accompanied the fragmentation of jury issues 7-conflicts,
confusion, delays, waste of trial and appellate time, reversals, metaphysics,8 and the unique system that had developed for trial of'
personal injury suits.' The rule was a new beginning and an effort
to establish a jury system that would operate in the same way in
negligence cases as it successfully had served in all other kinds
of cases." The former rule was unique to Texas." It is now time to
special issue system as it was being practiced at the time. Of great concern was the large
number of issues which were required to be submitted to the jury. See McElhaney, Texas
Civil Procedure,Annual Survey of Texas Law, 24 Sw. L.J. 179, 188 (1970). For example, the
trial court had submitted fifty-three special issues, some with sub-parts, in the case of Metal
Structures Corp. v. Plains Textiles, Inc., 470 S.W.2d 93, 97 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971,
writ refd n.r.e.), a case against a steel manufacturer for damages resulting from the collapse
of a roof. In addition, the trial judge refused to submit sixty-five issues requested by the
defendant. Id. at 100.
In an attempt to simplify the submission-of a civil case to the jury, the Texas Legislature,
in 1971, passed H.B. 556 which would have adopted comparative negligence and abolished
the need for many special issues. On May 6, 1971, however, Governor Preston Smith vetoed
the proposed legislation, stating in his veto proclamation:
This Bill fails to meet two simple criteria of intelligibility and candor. The Bill is
both ambiguous and confusing, lacking the definition and provisions desirable in so
important a measure.
The constituti6nality of this Bill can be questioned as being in violation of Article
3, Section 35, of the Texas Constitution. It is imprudent to change the court law
everywhere in one giant single step.
The other sections of the Bill [other than comparative negligencel relating to
procedural changes involving 10-2 jury verdict and the elimination of special issues
threaten to usurp the power of the Supreme Court in that it mandates the Supreme
Court to make these specific changes in our existing civil procedures.
These two major changes, the 10-2 jury verdict and the elimination of special
issues, are a radical departure from our present proven system of civil procedure. The
Bill mandates the Supreme Court without regard to its knowledge, expertise, and will.
The Legislature in 1939 adopted what is now Article 1731a of the Revised Civil Statutes
of Texas giving to the Supreme Court rule-making power in matters of procedure. This
is a good law, and certainly the Supreme Court, in its wisdom, and not the Legislature,
is in a better position in the administration of justice to provide the rules of procedure.
Message from Governor Smith, TEx. H.R.J. 2958 (1971).
7. In 1922 the Supreme Court of Texas, in the case of Fox v. Dallas Hotel Co., 111 Tex.
461, 240 S.W. 517 (1922), set forth the meaning of submitting issues "distinctly and separately." Id. at 475, 240 S.W. at 521-22. The rule of Fox was followed until the revision of rule
277 on September 1, 1973. See Pope & Lowerre, Revised Rule 277-A Better Special Verdict
System for Texas, 27 Sw. L.J. 577, 582-83 (1973).
8. See Roosth & Genecov Prod. Co. v. White, 152 Tex. 619, 626-27, 262 S.W.2d 99, 103
(1953); Jack Cane Corp. v. Gonzales, 410 S.W.2d 953, 954 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio,
1967, no writ).
9. See Roosth & Genecov Prod. Co. v. White, 152 Tex. 619, 628-29, 262 S.W.2d 99, 104
(1953).
10. See G. HODGES, SPECIAL ISSUE SUBMISSION IN TEXAS § 35, at 71 (Supp. 1969); 3 R.
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examine the changes that have occurred in Texas jury submission
since the revision of rule 277.
What is an issue? When we wrote in 1973 and posed that question," we were asking the same question that Justice Sharp had
unsuccessfully tried to resolve thirty-three years earlier in Wichita
Falls & Oklahoma Ry. v. Pepper.3 Confusion has surrounded the
drafting of issues for more than fifty years.'4 The answer to the
question is now more apparent. The revised rule, at least, has established that an issue is no longer objectionable merely because it "is
general or includes a combination of elements,"' 5 thereby greatly
limiting the danger of reversals based upon rulings that an issue is
broad, global, or multifarious. Under the present rule, issues for the
jury may, and ought to be, asked broadly. Revised rule 277 has
rightfully brought personal injury litigation into the same system
that has always existed in land litigation, will contests, estate problems, oil and mineral disputes, and every other kind of litigation.'"
BROAD ISSUES ARE SUBMITTED IN GENERAL LITIGATION

Apparently, the atomization of special issues has never been seriously urged for civil trials in Texas other than in death and injury
cases," not even in cases of intentional torts.'" On another occasion,
McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 12.06.2 (rev. 1970); Pope & Lowerre, Revised Rule 277-A

Better Special Verdict System for Texas, 27 Sw. L.J. 577, 583-86 (1973); cf. Pope, Broad and
Narrow Issues, 26 TEx. B.J. 921, 921-22, 978 (1963) (rule 279). See generally Masterson,
Preparation and Submission of Special Issues in Texas, 6 Sw. L.J. 163 (1952); see also
Comment, Ultimate or Controlling Issues in Texas: Special Issue Submissions, 25 TEXAS L.
REv. 391 (1947).
11. See Page v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 349 F.2d 820, 826-27 (5th Cir. 1965). In Page Chief
Judge John R. Brown observed, "All of these collateral devices so dear to the heart of Texas
bred and Texas trained lawyers immersed in its complex system of special issue submission
. . .leads only to confusion and a proliferation of metaphysical terms scarcely understandable to the most astute scholar." Id. at 826-27.
12. See Pope & Lowerre, Revised Rule 277-A Better Special Verdict System for Texas,
27 Sw. L.J. 577, 580-82 (1973).
13. 134 Tex. 360, 368, 135 S.W.2d 79, 83 (1940).
14. See Jack Cane Corp. v. Gonzales, 410 S.W.2d 953, 954 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1967, no writ); G. HODGES, SPECIAL ISSUE SUBMISSION IN TEXAS § 35 (1959); 3 R. McDONALD,
TEXAS CIVIL PRCrICE § 12.06.1 (rev. 1970); Green, Identification of Issues in Negligence
Cases, 26 Sw. L.J. 811, 811 (1972); 10 TEXAS L. REV. 217, 220-21 (1932) (listing four different
views about what constitutes a single issue). See generally Comment, Ultimate or Controlling
Issues in Texas: Special Issue Submissions, 25 TExAS L. REv. 391 (1947).
15. TEX. R. Clv. P. 277.
16. Some of the non-negligence precedents are discussed in Pope & Lowerre, Revised
Rule 277-A Better Special Verdict System for Texas, 27 Sw. L.J. 577, 583-86 (1973).
17. See Address by W. James Kronzer, 1978 Judicial Section Conf. (Sept. 27, 1978):
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examples of broad submissions of jury questions were catalogued in
such wide-ranging actions as those involving common law marriage,
child custody, condemnation, wrongful collection efforts, divorce,
violation of city ordinances, adverse possession, and intentional
torts."
A number of recent decisions confirm the long-standing practice
in non-negligence cases that respects the discretion of trial judges
to submit broad questions. Typical of the decisions handed down
shortly before the revision of rule 277 are Haas Drilling Co. v. First
National Bank2 and Scott v. Ingle Brothers Pacific, Inc.' In Haas
Drilling, First National Bank in Dallas was sued upon the bank's
alleged oral promise, through its officer, to assume as its own debt
and pay the note and account of B & B Gas & Petroleum, Inc. The
court of civil appeals reversed a judgment for the plaintiff because
it regarded an issue as multifarious." In rejecting the holding that
the issue was multifarious, the supreme court recognized that more
latitude is permitted in non-negligence cases than in negligence
cases and pointed out that the intermediate court had relied upon
negligence cases only. 3 The court compared negligence precedents
that compelled narrow submissions with the non-negligence cases
that accorded latitude in questions to the jury and noted, as an
example, that the limitations issues in land cases are ordinarily
multifariously submitted. In Scott v. Ingle Brothers Pacific, Inc.,2 .
a suit for breach of an employment contract, the supreme court
"[lit nonetheless appears that most of the 'hassle' centers about those [death and injuryl
cases."
18. See Grieger v. Vega, 153 Tex. 498, 504, 271 S.W.2d 85, 88 (1954); Fulmer v. Thompson, 573 S.W.2d 256, 258-59 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, writ ref d n.r.e.).
19. Pope & Lowerre, Revised Rule 277-A Better Special Verdict for Texas, 27 Sw. L.J.
577, 583-86 (1973); see Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Sharpstown State Bank, 460 S.W.2d 117, 121
(Tex. 1970) (agent's apparent authority); Brown v. Payne-Ladewig, Inc., 568 S.W.2d 159, 160
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (breach of contract).
20. 456 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. 1970).
21. 489 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1972).
22. First Nat'l Bank v. Haas Drilling Co., 446 S.W.2d 29, 35 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1969), rev'd, 456 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. 1970). The issue was, "Do you find ... that on or about
March 1, 1966, the Defendant, First National Bank in Dallas, by and through its vicepresident, H.M. Meredith, agreed to assume payment as its own debt the indebtedness then
owing to Haas Drilling Co., Inc. by B & B Gas & Petroleum, Inc.?" Haas Drilling Co. v. First
Nat'l Bank, 456 S.W.2d 886, 888 (Tex. 1970).
23. Haas Drilling Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 456 S.W.2d 886, 889 (Tex. 1970); see Blevins
v. Baker, 511 S.W.2d 375, 378 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, no writ) (more liberal grouping
of facts into single issue).
24. Haas Drilling Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 456 S.W.2d 886, 889 (Tex., 1970).
25. 489 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1972).
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approved the following issue against the objection that it was global:
"Do you find. . . that H. L. Scott was discharged by the Defendant
without good cause?"" There was an accompanying definition of
"good cause for discharge." The court, relying upon Haas Drilling,
held that the requested issues inquiring into specific acts that were
relevant to Scott's firing need not be submitted. 7
With such cases as Haas Drilling and Ingle Brothers appearing so
close to the effective date of the revisions to rule 277, the nonnegligence charges have undergone little change since September 1,
1973. Typical of the cases approving broad issues in post-September
1, 1973, non-negligence cases is Jon-T Farms, Inc. v. Goodpasture,
Inc. 5 in which the court of civil appeals upheld the submission of
the following as the controlling issue: "Did Jon-T Farms, Inc.,
breach and/or repudiate Contract No. 16,811 ($2.70)?"1 In another
case, concerning a libel action, the trial court, instead of asking a
question about each particular writing, asked: "Do you find . . .
that the Defendant Railroad stated in writing that Joe Wherry was
a narcotic user in violation of Railroad Rule G?" 30 The issue was
approved by virtue of revised rule 277.1' The submission of all elements of fraud in a single issue was approved in Shasteen v. MidContinent Refrigerator Co.32 The court, relying upon revised rule
277, wrote that "generality or 'multifariousness' alone is no longer
a ground for reversal." 3 3 A nuisance action against the city of Lubbock complaining of its operation of a sanitary landfill near plaintiff's property was submitted, with approval, in a single issue with
an accompanying definition of the term "nuisance. 3 Texas Gulf
26. Id. at 557.
27. Id. at 557.
28. 554 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see Lambert v.
H. Molsen & Co., Inc., 551 S.W.2d 151, 153-54 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(no error in refusing to submit two specific issues concerning custom and usage of trade rather
than one broad issue).
29. Jon-T Farms, Inc, v. Goodpasture, Inc., 554 S.W.2d 743, 750 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
30. Houston B. & T. Ry. v. Wherry, 548 S.W.2d 743, 749 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst
Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e).
31. Id. at 750; cf. Fitzjarrald v. Panhandle Publishing Co., 149 Tex. 87, 92, 228 S.W.2d
499, 502 (1950) ("Was the newspaper article ... published and circulated by defendant...
with 'actual malice' toward plaintiff . . . ?)
32. 517 S.W.2d 437, 439 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ refd n.r.e.).
33. Id. at 439.
34. See City of Lubbock v. Tice, 517 S.W.2d 428, 429-30, 431 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1974, no writ). The issue was, "Do you find. . . that the City of Lubbock in its operation of
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Sulphur Co. v. Gladys City Co. 3 was a suit against Texas Gulf
Sulphur for its alleged failure to perform its obligation to use due
diligence in developing sulphur production. Against the attack that
the issue submitted by the trial court was global, overbroad, and a
general charge, the court recognized as the controlling issue:
"'[D]o you find that the Defendant failed to conduct its sulphur
mining operations on Gladys City Tract 41 with due diligence?' "'
Justice Keith for the court of civil appeals reviewed the supreme
court precedents and again called attention to the divergent rules
that the supreme court had adopted, saying: "The so-called 'broad
form' of submission in the non-negligence field has been widely
used and specifically approved by our Supreme Court." 7
The supreme court's most recent approval of the broad submission is its recommendation in Baker v. Goldsmith" that two issues
be joined as one issue in a bill of review case. The earlier case of
Alexander v. Hagedorn,31 had listed the issues for a bill of review
trial as (1) a meritorious defense, (2) that the party was prevented
from making by the fraud, accident, or wrongful act of the opposite
party, (3) unmixed with any fault or negligence of his own."' The
court in Baker, suggesting the procedures on remand, stated that
the second and third items "may be submitted in one broad issue
under Rule 277."'4
As these examples illustrate, courts had few problems in submitting what was then characterized as "broad" issues in nonnegligence cases prior to September 1, 1973; and, as was expected,
the revision of rule 277 brought little or no change in that practice.
This article now turns to the submission of the charge in the negligence case in an attempt to determine if the revision has accomplished the expected changes.
the landfill in question constitutes a nuisance, as that term is herein below defined, to Lloyd
(sic) Tice's property?" Id. at 429.
35. 506 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, writ refd n.r.e.).
36. Id. at 288.
37. Id. at 289; see City of Houston v. Lurie, 148 Tex. 391, 398-99, 224 S.W.2d 871, 876
(1949) (building being a fire hazard); Howell v. Howell, 147 Tex. 14, 17, 210 S.W.2d 978, 980
(1948) (divorce grounded on cruel treatment); Air Force Village Foundation, Inc. v. Northside
Independent School Dist., 561 S.W.2d 905, 908, 909-10 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1978, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (tax exemption as public charity).
38. 582 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. 1979).
39. 148 Tex. 565, 226 S.W.2d 996 (1950).
40. Id. at 568-69, 226 S.W.2d at 998.
41. Baker v. Goldsmith, 582 S.W.2d 404, 409 (Tex. 1979).
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BROAD ISSUES MAY BE USED IN NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS

The charge in today's negligence action should be a relatively
simple document. Only three months after the effective date of the
revisions to rule 277, the Texas Supreme Court, in Mobil Chemical
Co. v. Bell,42 actually articulated a recommended form for the broad
submission of a negligence case.43 There were two plaintiffs; yet, the
supreme court's example for the charge on remand included only
seven issues." Although the case was not tried as a comparative
negligence case, the court's opinion still shows the simplicity of a
negligence charge. The issues that the court suggested were:
42. 517 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. 1974).
43. Id. at 256-57. Other recent cases approving the use of broad issues in personal injury
cases include:
Federal Employers Liability Act: Do you find that the railroad was negligent "in failing
to provide plaintiff with a reasonably safe place in which to do his work?" Scott v. Atchison,
T. & S.F. Ry., 572 S.W.2d 273, 281 (Tex. 1978) (on motion for rehearing).
Intersection Collision: "Do you find . . . that the traffic signal at Avenue C and 7th
Street in Bay City, Texas, was in a malfunctioning condition on the occasion in question?"
State v. Norris, 550 S.W.2d 386, 387 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Negligence: "Do you find . . . that on the occasion in question an agent, servant or
employee of Southern Steel Company failed to properly latch the tailgate as would have been
done by a person of ordinary prudence in the exercise of ordinary care under the same or
similar circumstances?" Southern Steel Co. v. Manning, 513 S.W.2d 273, 276 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1974, no writ); see Allright, Inc. v. McGee, 506 S.W.2d 339, 340 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (proper care of property by bailee).
Medical Malpractice: "Do you find . . . that Dr. Billy H. Lee was negligent in his
diagnosis and/or medical care and treatment of Joe Bert Andrews, Jr., deceased, after the
operation in question?" Lee v. Andrews, 545 S.W.2d 238, 247 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977,
writ dism'd). The application for writ of error was orginally granted in this case. It was
subsequently dismissed as moot.
Product Design: 'Do you find . . . that the Model 3030 IN Range manufactured by
Magic Chef, Inc. was defectively designed at the time it was sold to Park North Village?'
Magic Chef, Inc. v. Sibley, 546 S.W.2d 851, 855 n.2 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). The objection was that the question should have been whether or not the valve,
rather than the whole range, was defectively designed. Id. at 855.
In Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 847 n.1 (Tex. 1979), the court stated
that the correct issue and instruction in design cases are:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that at the time the [product]
in question was manufactured by [the manufacturer] the [product] was defectively
designed?
By the term "defectively designed" as used in this issue is meant a product that
is unreasonably dangerous as designed, taking into consideration the utility of the
product and the risk involved in its use.
Answer: "We do" or "We do not."
Id. at 847, n.1.
Slip and Fall: 'Do you find . . . that on the occasion in question an employee of
defendant had created a slippery condition on the hospital kitchen floor where plaintiff fell?'
Red Top, Inc. v. McNiel, 458 S.W.2d 826, 827 (Tex. Civ. App.-Ft. Worth 1970, no writ).
44. See Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 248, 256-57 (Tex. 1974).
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1. Did Edward Bell sustain an injury while on the premises of the
defendant on or about April 5, 1966?
2. Did J. A. Hurley sustain an injury while on the premises of the
defendant on or about April 5, 1966?
3. Was the escape of the acetic acid on the occasion in question due
to the negligence of defendant, its agents, servants, or employees?
4. Was such negligence, if you have so found, a proximate cause of
the injuries, if any, to Edward Bell?
5. Was such negligence, if you have so found, a proximate cause of
the injuries, if any, to J. A. Hurley?
6. Damages as to Edward Bell?
7. Damages as to J. A. Hurley?'"
The sample suggested by the court included broad issues concerning each plaintiff asking if he had sustained the injury, whether
there was negligence, if the negligence was a proximate cause, and
whether he sustained damages. Of course, the defendant also is
entitled to issues inquiring about the plaintiff's contributory negligence and proximate cause; and, in a comparative negligence case,
the negligence must be compared. The significance of Mobil
Chemical is that it removed the uncertainty regarding broad submission of the negligence issue as the controlling issue and stated
that it is not necessary to break that question into its many specific
grounds."e The decision was a departure from and a rejection of the
rule in negligence cases that had compelled a granulation of the
special issues. It was the death knell for the system of issue submission that began with Fox v, Dallas Hotel Co. 7 The supreme
court probably should have listed its own restrictive decisions that
were no longer binding or helpful as rules of procedure in the sub8
mission of negligence cases.
45. Id. at 256-57. The words "due to," found in issue 3, could be improved upon because
they suggest the causation which is asked about in issue 4.
46. See id. at 252, 255.
47. 111 Tex. 461, 240 S.W. 517 (1922). Compare id. at 475-76, 240 S.W. at 521-22 with
Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 252 (Tex. 1974).
48. Among those cases that appear to have been buried are: Barclay v. C.C. Pitts Sand
& Gravel Co., 387 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. 1965); Kainer v. Walker, 377 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. 1964);
Agnew v. Coleman Elec. Coop., Inc. 153 Tex. 587, 272 S.W.2d 877 (1954); Roosth & Genecov
Prod. Co., Inc. v. White, 152 Tex. 619, 262 S.W.2d 99 (1953); Solgaard v. Texas & N.O.R.R.,
149 Tex. 181, 229 S.W.2d 777 (1950); City of Fort Worth v. Lee, 143 Tex. 551, 186 S.W.2d
954 (1945); Walgreen-Texas Co. v. Shivers, 137 Tex. 493, 154 S.W.2d 625 (1941); Wichita Falls
& 0. Ry. v. Pepper, 134 Tex. 360, 135 S.W.2d 79 (1940); Fox v. Dallas Hotel Co., 111 Tex.
461, 240 S.W. 517 (1922); Coleman v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 241 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. Civ.
App-Dallas 1951, writ ref'd); Weidmer v. Stott, 48 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1932, writ refd). See generally 42 TExAs L. REv. 931 (1964); 8 S. TEx. L.J. 142 (1966).
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The court went out of its way in Mobil Chemical to advise Texas
practitioners that rule 277 had revised the charge in negligence cases
when it stated,
The rule means that in an ordinary negligence case, where several
specific acts of negligence are alleged and evidence as to each is
introduced, the submission of a broad issue inquiring generally
whether the defendant was negligent is not error and is not subject
to the objection that the single issue inquires about several elements
or issues."
The bench and bar, however, were slow to accept what the court had
stated. One writer's comment was, "If this case really means what
it says, we may be headed toward global submission of negligence
issues ..

. ".0The point, of course, is exactly that; global submis-

sion is now an accepted practice by virtue of rule 277.
Attorneys who interpret Mobil Chemical as applying only to cases
of res ipsa loquitur are misconstruing the opinion. The court did
indeed write about res ipsa loquitur in Mobil Chemical, but not
exclusively so. The opinion closed with a section titled "On Remand" in which guidelines were set forth for a proper retrial of the
case." The court's recommended charge included the broad negligence issue; it was not a recommended charge on res ipsa alone. The
opinion stated that the broad issue was proper even when specific
acts are alleged and the evidence supports each of them.52 The court
merely restated in its opinion the precept of rule 277 that "[i]t shall
not be objectionable that a question is general or includes a combination of elements or issues."53
How broadly a judge may submit a question to the jury was put
to a severe test by the charge in Members Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Muckelroy.5 ' The charge used in Muckelroy has been called a Sto49. Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 255 (Tex. 1974).
50. Morris, Special Issues and Instructions-CurrentProblems, in 1 STATE BAR OF TEXAS
ADVANCED CIVIL TRIAL COURSE A-23 (Jan. 1978).
51. Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 254-56 (Tex. 1974).
52. Id. at 255.
53. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277; see Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 255 (Tex. 1974).
54. 523 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ refd n.r.e.). The first
issue of the charge was:
SPECIAL ISSUE

No. 1

Whose negligence, if any, do you find from a preponderance of the evidence proximately caused the collision made the basis of this suit:
ANSWER: (a) The defendant, Verdie Webber.
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vail charge after Judge Tom Stovall who had used the form in more
than one hundred cases before it was tested in Muckelroy. The
objection to the Muckelroy charge was that the question was global.
The negligence special issue found in Muckelroy6 went beyond
Mobil Chemical's suggested broad charge because, in a single issue,
the court inquired about both negligence and proximate cause. Justice Evans, for the court of civil appeals, reviewed the strict rule
prior to the 1973 revision and quoted the supreme court's statement
in Mobil Chemical that a court may ask a broad issue inquiring
generally whether the defendant was negligent when several specific
acts of negligence are alleged and evidence is introduced on each. ' 7
The court went on to hold that "the trial court is not precluded from
submitting issues broadly under Rule 277 even though specific acts
or omissions comprising the elements of such issue have been specifically plead."58 On motion for rehearing, the court addressed the
(b) The plaintiff, Jasper Muckelroy.
(c) Both.
"(a)"
Id. at 79. Other charges similar to that found in Muckelroy have reached the supreme court
for review. See Pate v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 567 S.W.2d 805, 809 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Herrera v. Balmorhea Feeders, Inc., 539
S.W.2d 84, 85 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
55. Some judges add to the first issue of the Stovall charge an additional alternative
answer, designated as "Neither" or "No one." Judges who omit that option reason that it is
a prohibited alternative under Yarborough v. Berner, 467 S.W.2d 188, 192-93 (Tex. 1971),
which eliminated an issue on unavoidable accident. They reason further that both the plaintiff and defendant are free to argue, and do argue, that their respective clients were not
negligent. Jurors who are unable to find any negligence on the part of any party, will leave
the answer space blank. There is no compulsion that jurors make a finding of negligence, and
a verdict that is otherwise complete, in which jurors fail to find negligence by anybody, may
be received and may be the basis for a judgment denying any recovery.
Muckeiroy was not tried under article 2212a, but in a comparative negligence case, the
next issue would be along this line:
If your answer to Special Issue No. 1 is "c," and only in that event, then answer:
SPECtAL ISSUE No. 2
What percentage of the negligence that caused the occurrence in question do you
find from a preponderance of the evidence attributable to each of the parties found by
you to have been negligent? Answer by stating the percentage, if any, opposite each
name:
Defendant,
Plaintiff,
100%
Total
56. Members Mutual Ins. Co. v. Muckelroy, 523 S.W.2d 77, 79 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston flst Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
57. Id. at 81; see Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 255 (Tex. 1974).
58. Members Mutual Ins. Co. v. Muckelroy, 523 S.W.2d 77, 82 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [lst Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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situation in which a party pleads specific acts of negligence and
introduces evidence of other possible acts not pleaded. The court
concluded that "an instruction limiting the jury's consideration to
only those acts of negligence pleaded might properly be given by the
trial court in a appropriate situation."" The significance of
Muckelroy is that it confirmed the dicta in Mobil Chemical that
rule 277 meant what it said; the supreme court refused the writ of
error indicating "no reversible error." The Mobil Chemical and
Muckelroy charges are important because they reflect a renewed
judicial tolerance by trial and appellate courts for broad issues in
negligence cases akin to that long seen in the non-negligence cases.'
In Scott v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. ' the supreme court
again considered the breadth of special issues in personal injury
cases. Allen Scott, a brakeman for the defendant railroad, sued for
injuries he had sustained when a freight train on which he was
riding derailed. Scott testified that he was thrown around inside the
engine and a door beat upon his back because of a defective latch
that would not hold it closed. The trial court submitted only two
negligence issues, each of which was followed by an inquiry into
proximate cause. Special Issue No. 1 broadly asked whether "'on
the occasion in question the railroad was negligent.' "62 Special
Issue No. 3 specifically asked whether "'the door latch on the locomotive . . . was not in proper and safe condition on the occasion in
question.' "63 Upon an affirmative answer to the broad issue and a
59. Id. at 83.
60. A more recent example of a broad negligence charge is found in Pate v. Southern
Pac. Transp. Co., 567 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd
n.r.e.):
Whose negligence, if any, do you find from a preponderance of the evidence proximately caused the death of Carl Pate on the occasion in question?
Answer by stating one of the following choices, writing out your choice in the blank
below:
a. Southern Pacific Transportation Company,
or
b. Theobold Trucking Company,
or
c. Carl Pate,
or
d. Any combination of Southern Pacific Transportation Company, Theobold Trucking Company, and Carl Pate,
or
e. No one.
Id. at 809; see Herrera v. Balmorhea Feeders, Inc., 539 S.W.2d 84, 85 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
61. 572 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. 1978).
62. Id. at 276 n.2.
63. Id. at 276 n.2.
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negative finding to the narrow one, the trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff. The court of civil appeals reversed the
judgment and remanded the cause to the trial court, and the
supreme court affirmed. 4
The supreme court's opinion quickly generated a number of professional articles and discussions posing significant questions. Did
the opinion in Scott take back what the supreme court had stated
in Mobil Chemical and had permitted under the broader Muckelroy
charge? 5 Did the opinion throw the practice back to the narrow
issues required by Fox v. DallasHotel Co. 6 by resurrecting the pre1973 "distinctly and separately" requirement of rule 277 in a limiting instruction appended to a broad negligence issue? Is harm presumed if the limiting instruction omits any pleaded fact that has
no proof or omits some unpleaded fact about which there is some
proof? In our opinion, the supreme court's opinion stands for a
negative answer to each of the questions.
The pleadings, proof at trial, objections to the charge, and the
court's charge in Scott undergird the court's reasons for affirming
the court of civil appeal's reversal while still expressly reaffirming
its commitment to Mobil Chemical. Scott had alleged that: (A) the
defendant railroad failed to provide a reasonably safe place in which
to do his work; (B) the track and supporting bed and ties were faulty
in construction, materials, and maintenance; (C) the defendant violated article 63287 by failing to construct a roadbed with the necessary culverts or sluices to drain the land; and (D) the defendant
violated the Boiler Inspection Act 8 because the engine was not
safe. 9 In addition to those acts or omissions alleged, one who examines the whole record in Scott discovers that the plaintiff developed
some evidence, certainly more than a scintilla, from his own witnesses and the cross-examination of defendant's witnesses that: (E)
the defendant's track inspector did not ride ahead of the train to
inspect the tracks after the rain; (F) the defendant did not obtain

64. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Scott, 551 S.W.2d 740, 743 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1977), aff'd, 572 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. 1978).
65. It should be remembered that the writ of error in Muckelroy was refused with the
designation "n.r.e." For a discussion of eight possible explanations for the "writ ref'd n.r.e."
designation, see Wilson, Hints on Precedent Evaluation, 24 TEX. B.J. 1037 (1961).
66. 111 Tex. 461, 240 S.W. 517 (1922).
67. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6328 (Vernon 1926).
68. 45 U.S.C. § 23 (1970).
69. Scott v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 572 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Tex. 1978).
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radar or other storm information; (G) the defendant did not heed
the storm warnings it had received; (H) the defendant did not give
radio warnings to the engineer in time to stop at the washout; (I)
the train was going too fast; (J) the elevation of the tracks was so
low that the flood waters flowed over the tracks and washed away
the soil; and (K) the engineer delayed in braking the train.
The railroad defended on the ground that on the evening of the
accident a locally unprecedented rainstorm had occurred between
5:00 and 7:30 P.M. when more than six inches of rain fell, with more
than half of that amount falling in a period of thirty minutes. The
accident occurred about 9:00 P.M. The defendant railroad had
pleaded the defense of Act of God and produced considerable evidence from several witnesses concerning the storm. 0
The defendant railroad made two objections to plaintiff's broad
issue that asked whether or not the railroad was negligent on the
occasion in question. The objections were first, that Scott had not
pleaded a number of acts and omissions about which there was some
evidence; and second, that there was no evidence to support some
of the facts that the plaintiff had alleged." The supreme court's
opinion quoted only the conclusory statements of the objections, but
the transcript shows that the defendant's objections actually specified the allegations that the plaintiff had pleaded but failed to
prove. The objection also asked that the issue be limited to acts or
omissions about which there was some proof. The objections, however, did not specifically point to the unpleaded acts. At that stage
of the trial, Scott's case, as pleaded, was in a state of shambles. He
neither requested nor did the trial court submit, issues pertaining
to allegations (A), (B), or (C) as outlined above. The court did
submit a narrow issue pertaining to allegation (D), which the jury
refused to answer favorably for the plaintiff. The court, however, by
the submission of the broad negligence issue, permitted the jury to
make an affirmative finding for the plaintiff upon the basis of any
or all of allegations (A), (B), and (C), as well as upon any or all of
facts (E), (F), (G), (H), (I), (J), and (K), not one of which the
plaintiff Scott had alleged.
The supreme court affirmed the reversal of the judgment for the
plaintiff because of what it called "the wide variance between the
pleadings and unpled facts and circumstances from which the jury
70. Id. at 279.
71. Id. at 276-77.
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could have inferred that the railroad was negligent."" The court
found error in the variance and relied upon the provisions of rules
2777:1 and 279.11 In that posture, the court suggested that the way
to submit a case when the pleadings lag behind or greatly outdistance a party's evidence is to include the relevant acts and omissions
within the actual words of the issue or to submit the broad negligence issue accompanied by an instruction limiting the jury's consideration to the listed acts or omissions. 5 A similar suggestion had
been made in Muckelroy.11 In his motion for rehearing, plaintiff
Scott complained that the court, by requiring the limiting instruction to accompany the broad issue, was departing from its previous
approval of the use of broad issues. The court responded:
On the contrary, we recognized that Rule 277 gives the trial court
discretion "to submit separate questions with respect to each element
of a case or to submit issues broadly."
[Tihe court said in Mobil, and we reaffirm, that:
The rule (Rule 277) means that in an ordinary negligence
case, where several specific acts of negligence are alleged and
evidence as to each is introduced, the submission of a broad
issue inquiring generally whether the defendant was negligent is
not error and is not subject to the objection that the single issue
inquires about several elements of issues.77
In approving the broad form of the issue, the court also called attention to the broad issue common to F.E.L.A. cases, an issue that asks
whether a railroad failed to provide the plaintiff with a reasonably
safe place in which to do his work, and stated that this broad issue
72. Id. at 277.
73. TEx. R. Civ. P. 277. The rule states, in pertinent part, "In all jury cases the court
.. shall submit the cause upon the special issues . . . that are raised by the written
"
pleadings and the evidence in the case ....
74. Id. 279. The rule states, in pertinent part, "When the court submits a case upon
special issues, he shall submit the controlling issues made by the written pleadings and the
evidence
"
75. Scott v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 572 S.W.2d 273, 277-78 (Tex. 1978). The supreme
court suggested the following form of limiting instruction upon retrial of the case:
In your determination of the above question you shall consider only whether the railroad company was negligent in failing to have necessary culverts or sluices at or near
'Bridge 46.3, or [here listing any other acts or omissions raised by the pleadings and
the evidence upon the new trial].
Id. at 278.
76. See Members Mutual Ins. Co. v. Muckelroy, 523 S.W.2d 77, 83 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (on motion for rehearing).
77. Scott v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 572 S.W.2d 273, 282 (Tex. 1978) (on motion for
rehearing); see Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 255 (Tex. 1974).
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would have been approved had it been requested. 8
A variance of the proof from the pleadings has not been a frequent
basis for reversals because of the necessity to prove harmful error.
To be fatal, a variance must be substantial, misleading, and a prejudicial departure from the pleadings. 79 Scott was not an instance of
casual, slight, and immaterial matter that could be sifted from a
post-trial examination of the statement of facts to show that the
proof was different from the pleadings. The "wide variance" in
Scott was substantial and grievous. By his petition, Scott had
placed the defendant on notice of three pleaded matters that he
either did not prove or on which he had failed to request an issue;
he had failed to get a jury finding on his fourth and only other
pleaded matter; and he had given no pleading notice of seven other
matters about which he had introduced evidence. Therefore, the
jury's finding of broad negligence most likely was grounded upon
either unpleaded or unproved facts. Harm will not be presumed by
reason of a minor pleading defect, but the harm in Scott was not a
minor defect when one views the nature of the error, the degree of
the vice, and the record as a whole. 0
Pate v. Southern Pacific TransportationCo.,' decided just before
the supreme court handed down its opinion in Scott, approved a
broad issue without a limiting instruction." Carl Pate, forced to stop
his car on a railroad track when defendant Theobold Trucking
Company's driver failed to stop at a stop sign, died from injuries
resulting from Southern Pacific's train pushing his car into him as
he was running away. The trial court submitted a broad Stovalltype charge in which the jury was given five choices for determining
the outcome of the case. The defendant's objections that the issue
was overbroad, indefinite, confusing, and invited speculation were
overruled. Subsequently, the trial court rendered judgment for the
plaintiffs. The court of civil appeals, however, reversed and rendered judgment against Southern Pacific.83 Defendant Southern
Pacific, on motion for. rehearing, called the court's attention to the
78. Scott v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 572 S.W.2d 273, 281 (Tex. 1978) (on motion for
rehearing).
79. Stone v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 554 S.W.2d 183, 187 (Tex. 1977).
80. See Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Reese, 584 S.W.2d 835, 839-41 (Tex. 1979); Ford v.
Carpenter, 147 Tex. 447, 451-52, 216 S.W.2d 558, 560-61 (1949).
81. 567 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
82. Id. at 809.
83. Id.at 809.
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recent Scott opinion and asked for a reversal on the ground that the
jury had received no limiting instruction. The court of civil appeals
wrote on rehearing and acknowledged that the plaintiffs had alleged
a number of specific acts of negligence without producing proof on
some of them. 4 The court held, however, that although the defendant had objected to the broad issue, the failure to give a charge
that limited the negligence considerations to the facts pleaded was
harmless error without proof that the jurors knew what was in the
pleadings. 5 The court concluded that there was no showing that
anything had been injected into the case beyond the proof that the
jurors had heard and upheld the judgment. 6 Upon application, the
supreme court refused the writ of error, no reversible error.
Care at the charge stage, but before submission of the case to the
jury, can often avoid any need for a limiting instruction appended
to a broad issue, even if there is a substantial variance between
pleadings and proof. The rules of civil procedure prescribe a manner
for curing the variance. Rule 66 s" permits a trial judge to grant leave
to amend pleadings even when there is no trial by consent, as when
evidence is admitted over objection of counsel. The permission to
file the amendment is, of course, addressed to the discretion of the
trial judge."' Rule 67,11 on the other hand, permits a trial amend84. Id. at 809 (on motion for rehearing).
85. Id. at 809-10 (on motion for rehearing).
86. See id. at 809-10 (on motion for rehearing).
87. TEX. R. Civ. P. 66. The rule states:
If evidence is objected to at the trial 'on the ground that it is not within the issues made
by the pleading, or if during the trial any defect, fault or omission in a pleading, either
of form or substance, is called to the attention of the court, the court may allow the
pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when the presentation of the merits of
the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court
that the allowance of such amendment would prejudice him in maintaining his action
or defense upon the merits. The court may grant a postponement to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.
Id.
88. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Pierce, 153 Tex. 527, 531-32, 271 S.W.2d 422, 424-25
(1951); Vermillion v. Haynes, 147 Tex. 359, 365-66, 215 S.W.2d 605, 609 (1948); 2 R. McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRAcTICE

§ 8.04 (1970).

89. TEX. R. Civ. P. 67. The rule states:
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent
of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the
pleadings. In such case such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause
them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made by leave of
court upon motion of any party at any time up to the submission of the case to the
Court or jury, but failure so to amend shall not affect the result of the trial of these
issues; provided that written pleadings, before the time of submission, shall be necessary to the submission of special issues, as is provided in Rules 277 and 279.
Id.
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ment to conform the pleadings to the issues that are tried without
objection. The unpleaded evidence in Scott had been introduced
without objection. Had Scott's attorney moved the court to permit
the filing of an amended pleading, the variance between pleading
and proof may have been avoided. When Scott did not pursue that
course, however, the defendant railway avoided a trial by consent
by its objections to the charge.90
Trial judges who insist upon and carefully apply rule 274 can
eliminate most errors with respect to the scope of a Scott-type limiting instruction that accompanies a broad issue, whether it be that
of the plaintiff or the defendant. That rule says that "[a] party
objecting to a charge must point out distinctly the matter to which
he objects and the grounds of his objection" and also that "[any
complaint as to an instruction, issue, definition or explanatory instruction, on account of any defect, omission, or fault in pleading,
shall be deemed waived unless specifically included in the objections."" It is distinct objections at that stage of the trial that should
disclose any variances so that the judge can either permit or deny
amendments to the pleadings and also formulate the limiting instruction to the broad issue upon the basis of the objections. Neither
trial nor appellate judges should countenance broad and obscure
objections to an issue that hide or cover an unpleaded matter or a
pleaded but unproved matter. Objections to a broad issue should
list each act or omission that is outside of the pleadings or is unproved. The objector's failure to comply with the demands of rule
274 will waive his objection. Insistence by trial and appellate judges
upon compliance with rule 274 will resolve the problems a trial
judge might have in conforming the limiting instruction to include
the items listed in the objections that were not tried by consent and
not included in a trial amendment. In this context, a limiting Scotttype instruction in a personal injury action is no more onerous nor
fraught with danger of reversible error than any other trial problem
that has its genesis in a variance of the proof from the pleadings.
A trial judge invites unnecessary problems by submitting either
90. See Harkey v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 146 Tex. 504, 508-09, 208 S.W.2d 919,
922 (1948); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Sides, 403 S.W.2d 519, 521 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1966,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Missouri-K. T. R.R. v. Franks, 379 S.W.2d 415, 416 (Tex. Civ. App.Eastland 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.); United Benefit Fire Ins. Co. v. Stock, 344 S.W.2d 941, 943

(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1961, no writ); 2 R.

McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE

§ 5.18

(1970).
91. TEX. R. Civ. P. 274 (emphasis added); see Davis v. Campbell, 572 S.W.2d 660, 663
(Tex. 1978); 2 R. MCDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 5.18 (1970).
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the plaintiff's or defendant's case both broadly and narrowly as
happened in Scott. Logically, the broad negligence issue includes all
of its narrow parts. The submission of the case by both methods is
not only an unfair double submission; it also invites the danger of
conflicting answers. In Scott, the defendant railroad made the double submission argument in its brief to the court of civil appeals 2
A party is not entitled to the best of both worlds, but there may
be exceptions even to this rule. For example, one who relies upon
negligence per se either as a plaintiff or a defendant may be entitled
to the specific issue about the asserted violation of the law. That
party also may have other distinct claims that he wants submitted
in a broad issue. The broad negligence issue may embrace the facts
of the negligence per se claim. While that problem has not yet been
presented, it seems that the negligence per se issue could be submitted as well as the broad negligence issue, but the instruction on the
broad issue in that case would be one that excludes the specific
negligence per se fact.
A lesson that all trial judges and lawyers should learn from Scott
is that routinely and as a standard part of a trial, careful judgments
must be made just prior to the submission of the issues to a jury so
that the pleadings may be coordinated with the evidence produced
at trial. Trial judges should insist upon "distinct" objections to
broad issues, specifying any variances in pleadings and proof. Upon
disclosure of distinct variances, judges should either make judgments about curative trial amendments or carefully word the limiting instruction. The luxury that one might enjoy in a post-trial
search of a statement of facts to locate variances will be avoided
when it is recognized that it is the burden of the objector to an
issue to locate the variances before submission to the jury.
One important distinction between the practice permitted under
Scott and that required by Fox v. Dallas Hotel Co. is that a single
answer to a single broad negligence issue is approved by the decision
in Scott. Different jurors may for different reasons arrive at the
finding, vel non, of negligence. Under Fox the separate facets of
negligence had to be submitted separately and distinctly and all
jurors had to agree upon the specific reason for the negligence. Additionally, since the revision of rule 277 in 1973, a number of specific
defenses have been abolished as inferential rebuttal issues, as duplications of other concepts, or for other reasons. Simplification of
92. See Brief for Appellant, Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Scott, 551 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1977), aff'd, 572 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. 1978).
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issues has been in part accomplished; but, according to Scott, this
goal is not achieved at the cost of obliterating the rules concerning
fair notice by pleadings. The rules about pleadings are not and
ought not to be any different in the highly visible personal injury
fields of the law than in the hundreds of other classes of lawsuits
that apply rules 277 and 279. Scott, viewed in perspective with trial
practice generally, is more a lesson about harmful error resulting
from variances in pleadings and proof that a lesson about personal
injury charges. Under the holding in Scott, rule 277 is a fair rule
permitting a single issue that is within the pleadings and the proof.
With the revision of rule 277, the trial judge is no longer shackled
to one form of submission of the negligence case to the jury. He may
now submit issues to the jury in several different ways.9" First, the
single broad negligence issue and the single proximate cause issue
in the pattern of the supreme court's suggestions found in Mobil
Chemical may be submitted. 4 If the proof follows the pleadings,
there is no need for a limiting instruction. If the proof substantially
exceeds or falls short of the notice given by the pleadings, the limiting instruction should be given on request. 5 Second, the even
broader Stovall charge may be given, but it too would need a limiting instruction if there are problems with the identity of proof and
pleadings." Third, a checklist may be given since this form is authorized by paragraph four of rule 277.11 Finally, the form of submis93. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 277. Comparative negligence was first introduced in Wisconsin.
Under a comparative negligence system, cases can be submitted in several different ways:
(1) the ultimate fact, which merely asks the jury to determine the ultimate degrees of liability
of each party; (2) the specific special verdict, which inquires about specific acts of negligence;
or (3) the fault verdict, which states only the percentage that the defendant was negligent.
See generally C. HEr" & C. HEr, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL §§ 8.20 to .50 (rev. 1978).
94. See Scott v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 572 S.W.2d 273, 278, 282 (Tex. 1978); Mobil
Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 256-57 (Tex. 1974).
95. See Scott v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 572 S.W.2d 273, 278 (Tex. 1978).
96. See id. at 276, 277-78; Members Mutual Ins. Co. v. Muckelroy, 523 S.W.2d 77, 8182 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston list Dist.] 1975, writ refd n.r.e.). See notes 54-60 supra and
accompanying text.
97. Paragraph four of rule 277 states:
The court may submit special issues in a negligence case in a manner that allows a
listing of the claimed acts or omissions of any party to an accident, event, or occurrence
that are raised by the pleadings and the evidence with appropriate spaces for answers
as to each act or omission which is listed. The court may submit a single question,
which may be conditioned upon an answer that an act or omission occurred, inquiring
whether a party was negligent, with a listing of the several acts or omissions corresponding to those listed in the preceding question and with appropriate spaces for each
answer. Conditioned upon an affirmative finding of negligence as to one or more acts
or omissions, a further question may inquire whether the corresponding specific acts
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sion used prior to the revision of rule 277, with a separate question
for each separate ground relied upon, may be used." The supreme
court has approved all four methods,99 and by its approval has given
a wider freedom to the trial court to submit issues broadly. The trial
judge, however, should not mix the methods in the same charge.
SATELLITE ISSUES HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED IN NEGLIGENCE CASES

The study and practice of law, in large measure, requires the
capacity to handle and think in terms of a special professional vocabulary. But a trial system involving jurors as the conscience of a
community requires lawyers to communicate law words to the lay
fact finders in terms that they can understand. Most professions
need not confront this dilemma. They use their loaded words and
perform their ministry without the necessity of communicating with
a committee of six or twelve individuals who must make ultimate
fact decisions. A workable system of trials, however, must be com-,
prehensible to jurors.
Many legal doctrines begin as good argument conceived by some
ingenious attorney for the purpose of forcefully driving home a point
to a court or jury. As the idea becomes clear, it crystallizes into a
phrase, usually of two to three words, such as unavoidable accident,
sudden emergency, imminent peril, last clear chance, negligence per
se, voluntary assumption of risk, open and obvious, sole proximate
cause, or but-for cause. Latin is also helpful, as witnessed by res ipsa
loquitur, volenti non fit injuria, and damnum absque injuria. Precedents then begin to build around the phrase to the point that it
gains stature beyond mere argument. The special facts of each new
precedent become the subject of analysis, notes, comments, and
lectures. After a period of professional attention, a definition
evolves. The definition will ordinarily contain more than one part,
and thus, a new doctrine is born. The argument may mature enough
to warrant black letter print and perhaps even claim a little space
or omissions (listing them) inquired about in the preceding questions were proximate
causes of the accident, event, or occurrence that is the basis of the suit. Similar forms
of questions may be used in other cases.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 277; see Scott v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 572 S.W.2d 273, 278, 282 (Tex. 1978).
A sample checklist also was included in Pope & Lowerre, Revised Rule 277-A Better Special
Verdict System for Texas, 27 Sw. L.J. 577, 591 (1973). See generally 1 STATE BAR oF TEXAS,
TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES, Sample Charge A, at 11-12 (Supp. 1973).
98. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277 (court may "submit separate questions with respect to each
element of a case"); see Scott v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 572 S.W.2d 245, 277-78 (Tex. 1978).
99. See Scott v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 572 S.W.2d 245, 276, 277-78, 282 (Tex. 1978).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol11/iss1/1

20

Pope and Lowerre: The State of the Special Verdict - 1979.

19791

SPECIAL VERDICT-1979

in the Restatement. A surprising number of negligence doctrines
began in a like manner; that is, as good legal arguments pertaining
to whether negligence did or did not exist. Subsequently, they developed into independent excuses or defenses to the central negligence
issue. These doctrines are called satellite issues.
Advocates are creative. They constitute the strength of a system
that must adapt to settled tenets that are constantly changing. In
an all-or-nothing system pitting negligence against contributory
negligence, the purpose of many good jury arguments, and the resulting satellite issues, is to mitigate the harshness of total victory
or total defeat. In a system of negligence law that compares the
negligence of the actors and apportions the damages accordingly,
however, those satellite issues lose their purpose. They are returned
to their original rightful status as arguments-good arguments, but
arguments nonetheless.
The true advocate is also aggressive, as he ought to be. He insists
upon the full right to argue his cause, but he also wants the judge,
to the extent that the judge will yield, to help him by telling the
jurors just a few things that might nudge them toward his side of
the case. It is a strong judge who can stand against the importunities
of expert lawyers and stick to questions that comport with Ockham's razor. In evaluating the present status of submission of satellite issues, a bold and general statement is that they have no status.
Since the decision in Yarborough v. Berner'00 in 1971, the adoption
of comparative negligence, and the revision of rule 277, all of the
satellite issues have been abolished in negligence cases. Let us call
the roll.
Unavoidable Accident. In 1971 in Yarborough a unanimous court
held that an instruction, rather than a separate question to the
jurors, was the correct way to handle unavoidable accident.""° Surprisingly, it had taken thirty years for the supreme court to take this
affirmative action after it had held in 1941, in Wheeler v. Glazer,'02
that all that was necessary for a fair trial involving unavoidable
accident was for the court to tell the jurors that they need not
necessarily find that one or the other of the parties to the suit was
to blame for the occurrence. 10 3 In Yarborough the court finally gave
force to this conclusion. 0 If the real purpose of the unavoidable
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

467 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. 1971).
Id. at 193.
137 Tex. 341, 153 S.W.2d 449 (1941).
Id. at 347, 153 S.W.2d at 452.
See Yarborough v. Berner, 467 S.W.2d 188, 192-93 (Tex. 1971).
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accident issue was to make sure that the jury was advised of the
possibility that neither party might be at fault, that purpose would
be served better by an explanatory charge or a definition instead of
an issue. The court, in abolishing the issue, condemned it as a trap
for the jury,'05 as an instrument for raising conflicts in jury issues
that would defeat a verdict and a trial,'"' as a complicating factor
in a charge,'"7 and as an issue smothering what otherwise would be
a simple submission of a negligence case.0 8
Sudden Emergency. Sudden emergency is another doctrine that
was abolished as a separate issue by the decision in Yarborough.'"I
That concept, and the elusive doctrine of imminent peril, have produced much confusion with the bench as well as the bar. 110 The
dilemma, however, has now been resolved. Although sudden emergency should still be defined or explained to the jury,"' the doctrine
of imminent peril has recently been discarded by the supreme court,
2
both as an issue and as an instruction.1

Voluntary Assumption of Risk. In negligence actions voluntary
assumption of risk has been subsumed under the contributory negligence issue. The supreme court in Farley v. M M Cattle Co. "I stated
that, in the absence of a knowing and express oral or written consent
to the dangerous activity or condition, "the reasonableness of an
actor's conduct in confronting a risk will be determined under principles of contributory negligence.""' The demise of voluntary assumption of risk, however, was not sudden. Misgivings about its
validity had been raised by the supreme court in Adam Dante Corp.
v. Sharpe."' Prior to Adam Dante many excellent opinions and
105. Id. at 192; see Green, Blindfolding the Jury, 33 TEXAS L. REv. 273, 277-78 (1955).
106. Yarborough v. Berner, 467 S.W.2d 188, 192 (Tex. 1971); see Bradford v. Arhelger,
161 Tex. 427, 429, 340 S.W.2d 772, 773 (1960).
107. Yarborough v. Berner, 467 S.W.2d 188, 193 (Tex. 1971).
108. Id. at 193.
109. Id. at 192-93.
110. Our highest court has not always been able to separate the doctrines of sudden
emergency and imminent peril. See Davila v. Sanders, 557 S.W.2d 770, 770-71 (Tex. 1977).
Compare Goolsbee v. Texas & N.O. R.R., 150 Tex. 528, 531, 243 S.W.2d 386, 387-88 (1951)
and Yarborough v. Berner, 467 S.W.2d 188, 191-92 (Tex. 1971) with Del Bosque v. Heitmann
Bering-Cortes Co., 474 S.W.2d 450, 452-53 (Tex. 1971). See generally Thode, Imminent Peril
and Emergency in Texas, 40 TEXAS L. REv. 441 (1962).
111. See McDonald Transit, Inc. v. Moore, 565 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Tex. 1978); Davila v.
Sanders, 557 S.W.2d 770, 771 (Tex. 1977); Del Bosque v. Heitmann Bering-Cortes Co., 474
S.W.2d 450, 453 (Tex. 1971).
112. See Davila v. Sanders, 557 S.W.2d 770, 771 (Tex. 1977).
113. 529 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. 1975).
114. Id. at 758.
115. 483 S.W.2d 452, 458-59 (Tex. 1972).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol11/iss1/1

22

Pope and Lowerre: The State of the Special Verdict - 1979.

19791

SPECIAL VERDICT-1979

learned articles had given the doctrine a fair chance for survival, but
it was doomed in negligence cases because it was inextricably mixed
with and duplicated other related concepts. Judges and lawyers
alike walked insecurely through the jungle of abstractions. The supreme court often had no sure ground, at first seeking to apply the
doctrine restrictively" 6 but finally applying it to almost any negligence case." 7
. In Adam Dante the supreme court analyzed the several overlapping concepts that the trial judge and practitioners faced with the
rather simple facts of a lady slipping on a foamy substance on the
floor of a health spa."' Untangling the three elements of voluntary
assumption of risk first required the recognition that the doctrines
known as volenti non fit injuria and voluntary assumption of risk
are, in truth, the same thing."' Second, voluntary assumption of
risk had to be unsnarled from the spurious "open and obvious"
issue." ° And, finally, the doctrine had to be exposed as an affirmative defense to a plaintiff's burden to negate substantially the same
issues; i.e., the "no-duty" issues. 2 ' Under prior practice, there had
existed a triple submission of the same issue, each disguised by
name only. The court in Adam Dante, however, did not abolish
voluntary assumption of risk. Instead, it held that the three separate special issues should be gathered into a single issue and should
be asked with an accompanying definition of the term.' The court
then suggested a form of the issue and an accompanying explanation that should be employed on retrial.'2 3 Thus, the first step was
116. See Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368, 377 (Tex. 1963).
117. See Coleman v. Hudson Gas & Oil Corp., 455 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. 1970).
118. Adam Dante Corp. v. Sharpe, 483 S.W.2d 452, 453 (Tex. 1972).
119. Id. at 458; see Wood v. Kane Boiler Works, Inc., 150 Tex. 191, 195-96, 238 S.W.2d
172, 174-75 (1951). See generally 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW oF TORTS § 27.13 (1956);
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 68 (4th ed. 1971).
120. See Adam Dante Corp. v. Sharpe, 483 S.W.2d 452, 457 (Tex. 1972).
121. See id. at 458.
122. See id. at 459.
123. See id. at 458 n.2.
Defendant's Issues
(Assumption of Risk)
Did plaintiff voluntarily assume the risk of (stating it)? (Subjective Test)
You are instructed that in order for the plaintiff (naming), to assume the risk,
she must have actually known of the condition which caused her injury and she
also must have actually and fully appreciated the nature and extent of the
danger involved in encountering the condition, and she must have voluntarily
and of her own free will encountered the danger of the condition causing her
injuries, if any.
Id. at 458 n.2.
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taken toward deleting the doctrine of voluntary assumption of risk
as an issue in negligence cases.
The next attack upon voluntary assumption of risk came in the
case of Rosas v. Buddies Food Store.124 The case did not abolish the
doctrine as a defense in negligence cases because a majority of the
court believed that the defense had not been preserved by either
pleading or proof. 1 5 The dicta, however, seriously battered the doc2
trine. , 1
The blow that ended the defense of voluntary assumption of risk
was the passage of article 2212a,'27 which adopted a system for comparing negligence and apportioning damages according to the percent of the plaintiff's and defendant's respective negligence. Voluntary assumption of risk, which operates as a complete and total bar
to recovery, cannot coexist with comparative negligence.2 In
Farley, unlike Rosas, voluntary assumption of risk was asserted as
a defense. 129 The court called attention to the compelling reasons
that Rosas had already marshalled, particularly the adoption of the
comparative negligence statute, and then abolished the doctrine in
negligence cases. 13 0 Voluntary assumption of risk, however, has
been abolished in negligence cases only; it is still a valid defense in
case,132 such
a product liability case,' 3 ' as well as in a strict liability
33
as a suit for damages caused by a vicious animal.'
Open and Obvious. The spurious "open and obvious" concept was
the next to go. It was exposed in Adam Dante,13 but abolished as
both a special issue and as a separate concept in Massman-Johnson
v. Gundolf. 5 Judges and lawyers, after decades of scholarly effort,
124. 518 S.W.2d 534, 538-39 (Tex. 1975).
125. Id. at 540 (Walker, J., concurring); see Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751,
758 (Tex. 1975).
126. See Rosas v. Buddies Food Store, 518 S.W.2d 534, 538-39 (Tex. 1975).
127. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1978).
128. See Pope & Lowerre, Revised Rule 277-A Better Special Verdict System for Texas,
27 Sw. L.J. 577, 588 (1973).
129. Compare Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 758 (Tex. 1975) with Rosas v.
Buddies Food Store, 518 S.W.2d 534, 540 (Tex. 1975) (Walker, J., concurring).
130. Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 758 (Tex. 1975); see Rosas v. Buddies
Food Store, 518 S.W.2d 534, 538-39 (Tex. 1975).
131. See General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 351 (Tex. 1977); Henderson
v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87, 90-91 (Tex. 1974).
132. See Farley v. M.M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 758 (Tex. 1975); Henderson v. Ford
Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87, 90 (Tex. 1974). See generally Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 2, 2-6 (1976).
133. See Marshall v. Ranne, 511 S.W.2d 255, 261 (Tex. 1974).
134. See Adam Dante Corp. v. Sharpe, 483 S.W.2d 452, 457 (Tex. 1972).
135. 484 S.W.2d 555, 556-57 (Tex. 1972).
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had never been able to agree upon the proper role for "open and
obvious" in the trial of a negligence case. One branch of experts
treated "open and obvious" as a separate and distinct fact issue that
should be submitted to the jury.' 3 On the other hand, an equally
proficient group of scholars viewed the term as a state of the proof
that, when found, demonstrated as a matter of law that the plaintiff
knew and appreciated a specific danger. The doctrine, according to
3
them, did not present a question of fact.' 1
The phrase has now been exposed as a shorthand way for the court
to conclude that the plaintiffs knowledge and appreciation of both
the nature and extent of a danger had been established as a matter
of law. 3'8 The supreme court held in Massman-Johnsonthat an issue
inquiring whether or not a condition is open and obvious should not
be submitted.' 39 Furthermore, an instruction of the term should not
be given to the jury.
With the passage of the comparative negligence statute, negligence established even as a matter of law does notamount to a total
victory or defeat. The negligence existing as a matter of law still
must be compared to the negligence, if any, of the other parties. As
the supreme court stated in Parker v. Highland Park, Inc.:110
Knowledge and appreciation, though proved as a matter of law, do
not necessarily establish contributory negligence as a matter of law.
In a case that is controlled by the comparative negligence statute, a
plaintiff's contributory negligence that is established as a matter of
fact or as a matter of law must then be compared with the negligence
of the other parties, assuming that there is a finding of proximate
cause in each instance."'
136. See Goodson v. Southland Corp., 454 S.W.2d 823, 826 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.); El Rancho Restaurants, Inc. v. Garfield, 440 S.W.2d 873, 877 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio, 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Crowell-Gifford Furniture Co. v. Cloutman,
276 S.W.2d 539, 544 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.); 9 R. STAYTON,
STAYTON TEXAS FORMS § 5041, at 483 (1961); Keeton, PersonalInjuries Resulting From Open
and Obvious Conditions-SpecialIssue Submission in Texas, 33 TEXAS L. REV. 1, 11 (1954).
137. See Scott v. Liebman, 404 S.W.2d 288, 290 (Tex. 1966); Wesson v. Gillespie, 382
S.W.2d 921, 925-26 (Tex. 1964); Schiller v. Rice, 151 Tex. 116, 121, 246 S.W.2d 607, 611
(1952); Houston Nat'l Bank v. Adair, 146 Tex. 387, 390, 207 S.W.2d 374, 376 (1948); Houston
Sports Ass'n, Inc. v. Russell, 450 S.W.2d 741, 746 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1970, writ refd n.r.e.); A.C. Burton Co. v. Stasny, 223 S.W.2d 310, 312-13 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1949, writ ref'd). See generally Greenhill, Assumption of Risk, 16 BAYLOR
L. REV. 111, 114-18 (1964).
138. See Massman-Johnson v. Gundolf, 484 S.W.2d 555, 556 (Tex. 1972).
139. Id. at 556-57.
140. 565 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1978).
141. Id. at 521; see Hendrix v. Jones-Lake Constr. Co., 570 S.W.2d 546, 551 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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The court in Parker, borrowing language from a court of civil appeals decision that had been written twenty-six years before,' also
explained that the use of the "open and obvious" concept as a
separate defense was misleading because there are open and obvious
conditions of danger that do not preclude recovery.' Danger is relative, and persons may incur some hazards in the exercise of ordinary
44
care.
No-Duty. Jury confusion reached its zenith in the practice that
required answers in premises cases to the so-called "no-duty" issues. Certainly jurors should not be expected to understand terms
that judges and advocates cannot explain. In order for the plaintiff
to recover in a premises case he had to obtain jury findings that he
did not have actual knowledge of the dangerous condition and that
he did not fully appreciate the nature and extent of the danger."'
Connected with those issues was the concept of "open and obvious"
dangers discussed previously. The openness and obviousness of the
danger served to excuse the defendant because he was then charged
with no duty to warn, to make safe, or to do that which was unnecessary. 46 Even if a plaintiff/invitee secured findings negating the "noduty" issues of knowledge and appreciation, the defendant, under
the practice of duplicating issues, still had the opportunity to eliminate his own duty to the plaintiff by obtaining findings that the
plaintiff had voluntarily assumed the risk.'47 With the burden on the
defendant, the same two "no-duty" issues were again submitted
along with an additional one that asked whether the plaintiff had
voluntarily encountered the danger.' The presence of a duty depended not only upon the conduct of the defendant, but also on the
conduct of the plaintiff/invitee.11 The plaintiff/invitee had the bur142. See Camp v. J.H. Kirkpatrick Co., 250 S.W.2d 413, 417-18 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
143. Parker v. Highland Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512, 520-21 (Tex. 1978).
144. See Lang v. Henderson, 147 Tex. 353, 357-58, 215 S.W.2d 585, 587 (1948); McAfee
v. Travis Gas Corp., 137 Tex. 314, 320-21, 153 S.W.2d 442, 447 (1941); Henwood v. Gilliam,
207 S.W.2d 904, 906 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1947, writ ref'd); Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Blake,
175 S.W. 2d 683, 685 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1943, writ ref'd); San Angelo Water, Light
& Power Co. v. Anderson, 244 S.W. 571, 572 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1922, writ dism'd).
145. See Parker v. Highland Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512, 516-17 (Tex. 1978); Adam Dante
Corp v. Sharpe, 483 S.W.2d 452, 455, 457 (Tex. 1972); Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc.,
371 S.W,2d 368, 378-79 (Tex. 1963); Hendrix v. Jones-Lake Constr. Co., 570 S.W.2d 546, 549
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
146. See Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368, 378 (Tex. 1963).
147. See Adam Dante Corp. v. Sharpe, 483 S.W.2d 452, 457-58 (Tex. 1972).
148. See id. at 455 n.1.
149. See Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368, 378-79 (Tex. 1963).
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den to prove the defendant's breach of duty and to negate the confusing "no-duty" issues.'5 0 The invitee's conduct was measured by
a subjective test; the defendant's conduct was measured by an
objective test.'5 ' Premises cases were being tried with a double and
obscured submission of the same granulated issues. This state of
confusion and duplication of issues, first with the burden to negate
on the plaintiff/invitee, and then with the burden to prove on the
defendant, was condemned by the supreme court in Adam Dante.'52
Only recently, however, has the supreme court, in Parker,finally
abolished the "no-duty" concept in actions based upon negligence
and returned Texas practice in premises cases to the simple questions directing the attention of the jury to concepts of negligence
and causation.'53 Consideration by the jury of other mitigating factors depends upon advocacy-argument. The issues of "no-duty,"
"open and obvious," and "voluntary assumption of risk" have no
place in current Texas practice. They have all been abolished, so
that now the reasonableness of an actor's conduct under the circumstances is determined under the principles of contributory negligence in order that the negligence of the parties may then be compared.'
Last Clear Chance. Last clear chance was an attractive doctrine
that ameliorated the harshness of total defeat under a finding of
contributory negligence. As with the other satellite issues, it illustrates how a good jury argument can mature into a separate doctrine. In 1842 a plaintiff sued for damages to his mule. 5 0Apparently,
the plaintiff had tied up his mule in the middle of a highway, and
the defendant had driven into it. The defendant was negligent,
but the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. The argument was
that the least clear chance to avoid the accident and the resulting
injuries had been with the defendant, but that he had failed to do
so. Therefore, despite the plaintiff's contributory negligence, the
defendant was held liable. 56 The humble facts of the original case
150. See Adam Dante Corp. v. Sharpe, 483 S.W.2d 452, 455 (Tex. 1972); Halepeska v.
Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368, 379 (Tex. 1963).
151. See Adam Dante Corp. v. Sharpe, 483 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tex. 1972); Halepeska v.
Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368, 379 (Tex. 1963).
152. Adam Dante Corp. v. Sharpe, 483 S.W.2d 452, 458-59 (Tex. 1972); see Camp v. J.H.
Kirkpatrick Co., 250 S.W.2d 413, 416-17 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
153. Parker v. Highland Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512, 517 (Tex. 1978).
154. See id. at 517.
155. Davies v. Mann, 152 Eng. Rep. 588, 588 (1842).
156. Id. at 589.
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caused the doctrine to be dubbed the "jackass doctrine.' ' 57
When Texas embraced the doctrine in 1879, the supreme court
had the vision to state that a system of comparing negligence would
make its purpose unnecessary.15 Similar attacks were leveled upon
the continued use of the doctrine in the concurring opinion found
in Abalos v. Oil Development Co.,' 5 but the majority of the court
in that case rendered its decision without reaching the issue whether
last cleaychance was still a viable doctrine in Texas. In French v.
Grigsby,6 0 however, the issue was reached, and the court tersely
stated, "The doctrine of last clear chance or discovered peril

. . .

is

abolished as an issue or instruction."''6
Act of God. The inferential rebuttal issue known as Act of God is
no longer a proper separate issue. In Scott v. Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Ry. the defense was treated as an inferential rebuttal
issue, which is prohibited by revised rule 277.111 Like unavoidable
accident, however, the requesting party is entitled to a correct definition or instruction.' 3
Excuse for Breach of a Statutory Duty. A number of statutory
violations may constitute negligence per se, in which proof that one
violated the statute amounts to a fact finding of negligence. 4 When
this is the case, a separate finding of negligence is unnecessary."'
The need for a separate finding of negligence reappears, however,
when the violator produces evidence that he had a permissible excuse for his actions.' But to constitute an excuse for a violation,
157.
158.
159.
160.

W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 66, at 427 n.3 (4th ed. 1971).
Houston & T.C.R.R. v. Smith, 52 Tex. 178, 183-84 (1879).
544 S.W.2d 627, 633-34 (Tex. 1976) (Pope, J., concurring).
571 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1978).

161. Id. at 867.
162. Scott v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 572 S.W.2d 273, 279 (Tex. 1978).

163. Id. at 279.
164. For example, see the various traffic regulations in TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
6701d (Vernon 1977).
165. See Carter v. William Sommerville & Son, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 274, 278 (Tex. 1979);
Moughon v. Wolf, 576 S.W.2d 603, 606 (Tex. 1978); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. American Statesman, 552 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Tex. 1977); L.M.B. Corp. v. Gurecky, 501 S.W.2d 300, 303 (Tex.
1973); Southern Pac. Co. v. Castro, 493 S.W.2d 491, 497-98 (Tex. 1973); Impson v. Structural
Metals, Inc., 487 S.W.2d 694, 696-97 (Tex. 1972); Parrott v. Garcia, 436 S.W.2d 897, 900 (Tex.
1969); Hammer v. Dallas Transit Co., 400 S.W.2d 885, 887-88 (Tex. 1966); Mundy v. PirieSlaughter Motor Co., 146 Tex. 314, 320, 206 S.W.2d 587, 590 (1947); Alpine Tel. Corp. v.
McCall, 143 Tex. 335, 340-41, 184 S.W.2d 830, 833-34 (1944); Phoenix Ref. Co. v. Powell, 251
S.W.2d 892, 896-97 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See generally 1
STATE BAR OP TEXAS, PATTERN JURY CHARGES §§ 5.06-.07, 5.09-.11, 5.14, 5.17, 5.22-.24, 5.28.31, 5.34 (1969 & Supp. 1973).
166. See Moughon v. Wolf, 576 S.W.2d 603, 604-05 (Tex. 1978); Missouri Pac. R.R. v.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol11/iss1/1

28

Pope and Lowerre: The State of the Special Verdict - 1979.

19791

SPECIAL VERDICT-1979

proof of a legally substantial excuse or justification must be introduced; "ordinary care does not necessarily constitute one of the
excuses ingrafted by the courts to the legislative standard.""'6 The
supreme court, in Impson v. Structural Metals, Inc.,"'6 adopted the
five basic categories of excuses or justification for violating the law
listed in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. '" A violation is excused
when:
(a) the violation is reasonable because of the actor's incapacity;
(b) he neither knows nor should know of the occasion for compliance;
(c) he is unable after reasonable diligence or care to comply;
(d) he is confronted by an emergency not due to his own misconduct;
(e) compliance would involve a greater risk of harm to the actor
or to others. "
Confusion existed prior to 1973 about the manner of submitting
a case of negligence per se in which the violator of a statutory standard defended upon the basis of some excuse for the violation. In
Hammer v. Dallas Transit Co."', the supreme court had held that
it was not necessary for the violator to submit an excuse issue to the
jury as long as there was some evidence that showed that the violation was arguably excused.' Subsequently, in Christy v. Blades'7 '
the court, without overruling Hammer, required the violator to obtain a jury finding that the violation was excused."' This conflict
was resolved in 1973 when in Southern Pacific Co. v. Castro'7 5 the
supreme court expressly overruled Christy and adopted the rule of
American Statesman, 552 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Tex. 1977); L.M.B. Corp. v. Gurecky, 501 S.W.2d
300, 303 (Tex. 1973); Southern Pac. Co. v. Castro, 493 S.W.2d 491, 497 (Tex. 1973); Parrott
v. Garcia, 436 S.W.2d 897, 900 n.1 (Tex. 1969); Missouri-K.-T. R.R. v. McFerrin, 156 Tex.
69, 81, 291 S.W.2d 931, 939 (1956); Antee v. Sims, 494 S.W.2d 215, 217-18 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Phoenix Ref. Co. v. Powell, 251 S.W.2d
892, 896 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1952, writ refd n.r.e.); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 288B (1965).
167. Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 24 Sw. L.J. 3, 18 (1970).
168. 487 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. 1972).
169. Id. at 696; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A (1965).
170. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A (1965).
171. 400 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. 1966).
172. Id. at 887.
173. 448 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. 1969).
174. Id. at 111; see Rash v. Ross, 371 S.W.2d 109,113-14 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
175. 493 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1973).
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Hammer."I The court held that once the violator had introduced
some evidence that his violation was excused by reason of one of the
five permissible excuse categories found in Impson, the burden
shifted to the party who asserts that his adversary has been negli77
gent per se to obtain a fact finding that the violator was negligent.
Along with the negligence issue, the party asserting negligence per
se would be allowed to submit an instruction regarding the establishment by the legislature of standards of safe conduct. 7 ,
The next case that treated the submission of the negligence per
se issues was L.M.B. Corp. v. Gurecky. 7 1 Among other things, the
defendant complained that the violator, Gonzales, had failed to
obtain a jury finding of the existence of an Impson-type excuse.
Repeating what it had earlier said in Castro regarding the submission of a contributory negligence issue with instructions, the supreme court held that a separate issue about excuse was unneces80

sary.1

The supreme court handed down its decision in Castro in January, 1973. While its explanation of the practice for omitting an issue
on excuse was consistent with Hammer and has been the rule of
later cases, there was a sentence in the opinion stating that "[flor
one to prove negligence per se, therefore, he must prove (1) a violation of the penal standard, (2) which is unexcused."'' The statement was written before the amendment of rule 277 that abolished
inferential rebuttal issues, and it is subject to misunderstanding. In
0
Moughon v. Wolf
'

2

the court corrected the sentence. For the same

reason that it is no longer necessary for one to prove and obtain a
finding that an incident was not an unavoidable accident, a party,
while required to prove and obtain a finding that his adversary
violated a penal standard, is not required to obtain a finding that
his adversary's violation was not excused. The excuse issue should
not be submitted and the burden is upon the violator of the law to
present any evidence excusing the violation. Moughon v. Wolf
stated:
176. Id. at 497-98; see Hammer v. Dallas Transit Co., 400 S.W.2d 885, 887 (Tex. 1966).
177. Southern Pac. Co. v. Castro, 493 S.W.2d 491, 498 (Tex. 1973); see lmpson v. Structural Metals, Inc., 487 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1972).
178. Southern Pac. Co. v. Castro, 493 S.W.2d 491, 498 (Tex. 1973).
179. 501 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. 1973).
180. Id. at 303; see Southern Pac. Co. v. Castro, 493 S.W.2d 491, 498 (Tex. 1973).
181. Southern Pac. Co. v. Castro, 493 S.W.2d 491, 497 (Tex. 1973).
182. 576 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. 1978).
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Generally, the litigant alleging negligence per se as a ground of
recovery must assume the burden of proving a statutory violation.
[Citations omitted.] The typical submission of such a case includes
an issue inquiring whether the party charged is actually guilty of
legislatively proscribed conduct along with an issue inquiring
whether the violative conduct was the proximate cause of the accident. The violator may excuse his conduct, but he must produce some
evidence of a legally acceptable excuse. If some evidence of a legally
acceptable excuse such as emergency, incapacity or impossibility is
present in the case, the litigant charging statutory violation must
assume a further burden. That burden entails requesting an issue
which inquires whether the litigant charged is guilty of negligence as
measured by the common law or reasonable person standard.18"
DEFINITIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS HAVE REPLACED MANY ISSUES

Rule 277 now states that the court shall submit such explanatory
instructions and definitions as shall be proper to enable the jury to

render a verdict, with the limitation that such instructions and
definitions shall not comment directly on the weight of the evidence
183. Id. at 604-05 (footnote omitted). The court further set forth a sample charge consisting of three issues:
ISSUE NO. I
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that on the occasion in question
[name of litigant charged with statutory violation] failed to keep [his or her] vehicle
completely within the right half of the roadway?
ANSWER "We do" or "We do not."
Answer:
If you have answered Issue No. I "We do" then answer Issue No. 2: otherwise do
not answer Issue No. 2.
ISSUE NO. 2
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that such failure was a proximate
cause of the occurrence in question?
ANSWER "We do" or "We do not."
Answer:
Id. at 604 n.3. If the trial court believes that some evidence of a legally permissible excuse
has been presented, then an additional issue should be submitted conditioned on an affirmative finding to Issue No. 1:
ISSUE NO. 3
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that such failure was negligence?
ANSWER "We do" or "We do not."
Answer:
Id. at 605 n.4. Finally, the court stated, "In conjunction with this common law negligence
submission and upon proper request, certain explanatory instructions may be submitted that
inform the jury of such matters as statutory standard of conduct and any legally acceptable
excuses that are supported by some evidence." Id. at 605 n.4.; see 1 STATE BAR OF TEXAS,
TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES § 5.11 (1969 & Supp. 1973) (example of instruction).
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or advise the jury of the effect of their answers. Before 'September
1, 1973, a large number of correct definitions and explanations had
developed in Texas. Those that relate to personal injury cases are
collected in the State Bar's Texas PatternJury Charges,"I but there
are others that relate to other kinds of significant litigation. Some
practitioners mistakenly think that the elimination of a special
issue has justified changes in and the addition of words to definitions or instructions that are rather standardized. Other practitioners seek to add words that are designed to push the jury one way or
the other. The changing of settled definitions and explanations
tends to create unnecessary problems. Revised rule 277 does not
suggest such an overhaul, and none is needed.
The Proper Use of Definitions and Instructions is Found in Many
Non-Negligence Cases
A long list of examples is available from almost any area of the
law to show the proper use of definitions or explanations that assist
the jury. These non-negligence cases have presented no significant
problem to the bench or trial bar. They tersely define or explain a
word or term but do not tell the jury what to do. Hundreds of
eminent domain cases have been tried since World War 1 with few
procedural problems by the use of broad issues and a few instructions and definitions. Market value" 5 has needed a definition, and
the nature of the estate taken needs to be explained so the jury will
not assume that too much or too little is being taken.' Charges
have been approved in wide-ranging fields of the law that have
included instructions or definitions for such terms as "serious fire
hazard,"'' 7 "cruel treatment," ' "peaceable, adverse and continuous possession,"'' "domicile,"" ' "wrongful killing,""' "common law
184. 1 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES (1969 & Supp. 1973).
185. See State v. Carpenter, 126 Tex. 604, 611-12, 89 S.W.2d 194, 198 (1936).
186. See Gleghorn v. City of Wichita Falls, 545 S.W.2d 446, 447-48 (Tex. 1976); Texas
Power & Light Co. v. Cole, 158 Tex. 495, 501-02, 313 S.W.2d 524, 529 (1958); City of Dallas
v. Anderson, 570 S.W.2d 62, 64 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ refrd n.r.e.); Texas Power
& Light Co. v. Lovinggood, 389 S.W.2d 712, 715-16 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1965, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
187. See City of Houston v. Lurie, 148 Tex. 391, 399, 224 S.W.2d 871, 876 (1949).
188. See Howell v. Howell, 147 Tex. 14, 17, 210 S.W.2d 978, 980 (1948).
189. See Pearson v. Doherty, 143 Tex. 64, 71, 183 S.W.2d 453, 456 (1944).
190. See Hough v. Grapotte, 127 Tex. 144, 145-46, 90 S.W.2d 1090, 1091 (1936).
191. See Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925, 929-30 (Tex. 1977); Grieger v. Vega, 153 Tex.
498, 503-04, 271 S.W.2d 85, 88 (1954).
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marriage,"'9 2 "good cause for discharge,' 19 3 "fraud,"'' "nuisance,"' '
and "due diligence."'9 9 It has been the extra words that have been
added to settled definitions that have created the problems. For
example, in a condemnation of a ten-acre site for a sewer plant, with
the evidence conflicting about the extent and nature of the site's
use, the court erred by adding to an otherwise correct instruction
that the jury should "'presume that the City of Pearland will exercise its rights and use and enjoy this property to the full extent for
such a sewerage disposal plant.'""'
Standard Definitions and Explanations in Personal Injury Suits
Were Not Changed by Revised Rule 277
Twenty-one years before the revision of rule 277, the supreme
court laid to rest, in DallasRailway & Terminal Co. v. Bailey,'l the
contention that new and independent cause was a separate and
distinct affirmative defense. ' The defendant had asserted that it
was entitled to a special issue as well as a definition or explanation
of the term. The court held that the defendant was not entitled to
an issue but that the definition of new and independent cause
should be included as a part of the definition of proximate cause.2 '",
The case is instructive since it, along with a line of prior cases,""
exemplifies the correct way to substitute a definition or explanation
for a special issue. Neither the definition of new and independent
cause nor the practice in which the definition was substituted for a
special issue has presented any apparent problem for the trial prac192. See Brown v. Brown, 256 S.W.2d 143, 151 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1953, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
193. See Scott v. Ingle Bros. Pac., Inc., 489 S.W.2d 554, 557 (Tex. 1972).
194. See Shasteen v. Mid-Continent Refrigerator Co., 517 S.W.2d 437, 438-39 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1974, writ refd n.r.e.).
195. See City of Lubbock v. Tice, 517 S.W.2d 428, 431 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974,
no writ).
196. See Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. Gladys City Co., 506 S.W.2d 281, 288-89 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
197. City of Pearland v. Alexander, 483 S.W.2d 244, 249 (Tex. 1972).
198. 151 Tex. 359, 250 S.W.2d 379 (1952).
199. Id. at 367-68, 250 S.W.2d at 383-84.
200. Id. at 368, 250 S.W.2d at 384.
201. See Jackson v. Edmondson, 136 Tex. 405, 407, 151 S.W.2d 794, 794 (1941); Texas
Motor Coaches v. Palmer, 132 Tex. 77, 78-79, 121 S.W.2d 323, 323-24 (1938); Tarry Warehouse & Storage Co. v. Duvall, 131 Tex. 466, 472-73, 115 S.W.2d 401, 404-05 (1938); Young
v. Massey, 128 Tex. 638, 640-41, 101 S.W.2d 809, 810 (1937); Southern Ice & Utils. Co. v.
Richardson, 128 Tex. 82, 84, 95 S.W.2d 956, 957 (1936); Phoenix Ref. Co. v. Tips., 125 Tex.
69, 73-74, 81 S.W.2d 60, 61-62 (1935).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

33

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 11 [2022], No. 1, Art. 1

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 11:1

titioner. As stated in Texas PatternJury Charges, the definition for
new and independent cause is "the act or omission of a separate and
independent agency, not reasonably foreseeable, which destroys the
causal connection, if any, between the act or omission inquired
about and the occurrence in question, and thereby becomes the
' 20 2
immediate cause of such occurrence.
Another example of the supreme court's substitution of an explanation for a separate issue is found in the decision of Moulton v.
Alamo Ambulance Service, Inc.20 3 The defendant, Alamo Ambulance, requested special issues inquiring whether Moulton, the plaintiff, had failed to mitigate his personal injuries by following his
physician's advice. The supreme court held that mitigation of damages was not an affirmative defense entitling a party to a separate
issue, but that the defendant was entitled to an instruction.' 4 The
court then suggested the wording for the instruction.'" 5
Unavoidable accident was eliminated as a separate special issue
in Yarborough.21' The court pointed out that the only real purpose
for submitting it as a definition was to call the matter to the attention of the jurors so that they would -not overlook it as an alternative. 0 The jury would thereby understand that it is not necessary
to find that one or the other of the parties was negligent. In Wheeler
v. Glazer01 Chief Justice Alexander had written: "This purpose is
fully accomplished when the jury is told that the occurrence in
question was an unavoidable accident if it happened without the
negligence of either of the parties to the suit."2 " The wording of the
definition recommended in Wheeler is significant more for the words
202. 1 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES § 2.03, at 47 (1969).
203. 414 S.W.2d 444, 450 (Tex. 1967).
204. Id.at 450.
205. Id.at 450.
[Tihe better practice generally would be to instruct the jury that in arriving at
its answer to the [damage] issue it should not include any sum for physical and
mental pain and suffering, loss of earnings, etc., if any, proximately caused by failure
of an injured person to care for and treat his injuries, if any, as a reasonable prudent
person would in the exercise of ordinary care under the same or similar circumstances.
Id.at 450.
206. Yarborough v. Berner, 467 S.W.2d 188, 192-93 (Tex. 1971).
207. Id. at 192.
208. 137 Tex. 341, 153 S.W.2d 449 (1941).
209. Id. at 347, 153 S.W.2d at 452. An analogous problem was raised in Select Ins. Co.
v. Boucher, 561 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. 1978). Boucher sued for total incapacity and the insurer
requested issues inquiring about partial incapacity. The court held that the issue was prohibited as an inferential rebuttal issue but the insurer was entitled to a correct definition. Id. at
476-77; see Dallas County v. Romans, 563 S.W.2d 827, 830 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, no
writ).
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that were omitted than for what was included. 1 ° The court believed
that the jury was sufficiently instructed by the usual explanation of
the term.
Res ipsa loquitur also may be submitted by an instruction. In
Mobil Chemical the supreme court set forth an example for the
submission of res ipsa, when the plaintiff has pleaded and introduced some evidence of both res ipsa and negligence, in a manner
that displaced three separate issues in order to determine whether
or not negligence exists. 1 ' The instruction, without telling the jury
which side will win or lose, simply instructs,
You are instructed that you may infer negligence by a party but
are not compelled to do so, if you find that the character of the
accident is such that it would ordinarily not happen in the absence
of negligence and if you find that the instrumentality causing the
accident was under the management and control of the party at the
time the negligence, if any, causing the accident probably occurred.,'
The most recent guidance from the supreme court about the
wording of an instruction comes from Scott v. Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Ry. 213 The defendant railroad had pleaded that the plain-

tiff had suffered his injuries in the train's derailment because an
unprecedented rainstorm and flash flood had caused the washout of
a portion of the roadbed. It insisted that "Act of God" was an
affirmative defense that entitled the railroad to a special issue. Although holding that the railroad was not entitled to the issue, the
court held that it was entitled to an instruction. 2 " The court suggested that the following explanatory instruction relating to "Act
of God" be given "after the definitions of 'negligence' and 'cause
in whole or part.'"
In connection with the above definitions and any special issue using
either term, you are instructed that an occurrence is not caused in
whole or in part by the negligence of any party if it is due solely to
an "Act of God.

215

The term "Act of God" would then be defined as follows:
You are instructed that by the term "Act of God" as used in this
210. The Wheeler trial court defined unavoidable as follows: .'By the term "unavoidable
accident" as that term is used in this charge is meant an occurrence that happens without
negligence on the part of the operator of the street-car in question or the driver of the truck
in question."' Wheeler v. Glazer, 137 Tex. 341, 346, 153 S.W.2d 449, 452 (1941).
211. Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 254-57 (Tex. 1975).
212. Id. at 257.
213. 572 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. 1978).
214. Id. at 279.
215. Id. at 280; see id. at 280 n.10.
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Charge is meant an accident that is due directly and exclusively to
natural causes without human intervention and which no amount
of foresight or care reasonably exercised could have prevented. The
accident must be one occasioned by the violence of nature, and all
human agency is to be excluded from creating or entering into the
cause. The term implys [sic] the intervention of some cause not of
human origin and not controlled by human power. If the derailment
resulted in whole or in part from human negligence it was not an
"Act of God." 2"
QUALITIES OF A CORRECT INSTRUCTION OR DEFINITION

An Instruction or Definition May Be General
Rule 277 relaxes the former practice of limiting the use of instructions, and thereby gives trial judges more discretion in the use of
instructions, by stating that an explanatory instruction or definition
that properly enables the jury to render a verdict does not constitute
a general charge." 7 It is noteworthy that the supreme court in Mobil
Chemical called its recommended definition of res ipsa loquitur a
"general instruction, ' ' 21 1 especially in light of Pittsburg Coca-Cola
Bottling Works v. Ponder,2 1 a case decided before the revision of
rule 277, in which the supreme court had condemned a res ipsa
loquitur charge for being general.2 0 The instruction in Mobil
216. Id. at 279 n.9.
217. TEx. R. Civ. P. 277; see Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 256 (Tex. 1974);
Forney v. Memorial Hosp., 543 S.W.2d 705, 708 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Zacek v. Automated Syss. Corp., 541 S.W.2d 516, 521 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Union Oil Co. v. Richard, 536 S.W.2d 955, 957 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1975, no writ). See generally Pope & Lowerre, Revised Rule 277-A Better
Special Verdict System for Texas, 27 Sw. L.J. 577, 587-88 (1973).
218. Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 257 (Tex. 1974).
219. 443 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1969).
220. Id. at 551. The instruction given in Pittsburg Coca-Cola was:
In connection with the foregoing Special Issues No. 3 and 4, you are instructed
that if the explosion, if any, was part of an occurrence as would not ordinarily happen
without fault on the part of the Defendant prior to and at the time of the delivery of
the Coca Cola bottle and its contents in question to the Plaintiff, and that the Coca
Cola bottle and its contents was handled with due care after such delivery, and that
the Coca Cola bottle and its contents was not altered or changed in any way after such
delivery and up to the time of any explosion, then you may find that the explosion, if
any, was caused by negligence, if any, of the Defendant under the doctrine of "res ipsa
loquitur" or "the event or thing speaks for itself." Furthermore, this doctrine of "res
ipsa loquitur" rests upon the proposition that such an explosion, if any, must be such
as in the ordinary course of events and things does not happen without negligence, if
any, on the part of the one having the exclusive management or control of the bottling
and delivery process.
Id. at 451.
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Chemical, however, is distinguishable from the one in Pittsburg
Coca-Cola because in Pittsburg Coca-Cola the instruction arrayed
the evidence and informed the jury of the effect of its answer.,'
Because of these errors, the instruction found in Pittsburg CocaCola remains improper under revised rule 277. A proper instruction
about res ipsa, however, would not be error merely because of its
generality. 2 2
Even before the revision of rule 277, the supreme court in
Southern Pacific Co. v. Castro223 had already authorized a very
broad and general definition or instruction on statutory standards
and excuse.2 4 The court made it clear that it was prepared to
broaden the scope of definitions used in negligence cases when it
concluded the Castro opinion by stating,
[Ulpon proper request, Southern Pacific will be entitled to a definition or instruction which informs the jury the Legislature has established a uniform standard of safe conduct for those who approach and
cross railroad crossings. The court may state the provisions of section
86, article 6701d. . . . The court may further instruct the jury that
Castro, as well as the whole public, was charged in law with knowledge of those safety provisions. The court may also give an appropriate definition or instruction concerning any excuse which is supported by some evidence and qualifies under the Impson rule.22 5
An Instruction or Definition Should Be Proper
Formerly, rule 277 permitted explanatory instructions or definitions that were necessary to enable the jury to render a verdict. 20
The revision changed the word "necessary" to "proper." '27 While it
is no longer required that the court submit instructions and definitions that are "necessary" to enable the jury to pass on the issues,
a "proper" charge should at least be a legally correct one.22 8 Clearly,
221. Compare Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 256 (Tex. 1974) with Pittsburg
Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Ponder, 443 S.W.2d 546, 551 (Tex. 1969).
222. See Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 257 (Tex. 1974).
223. 493 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1973).
224. See id. at 494.
225. Id. at 498.
226. Tex. R. Civ. P. 277 (1969); see Boaz v. White's Auto Stores, 141 Tex. 366, 370, 172
S.W.2d 481, 484 (1943).
227. Compare TEx. R. Civ. P. 277 ("explanatory instructions and definitions as shall be
proper to enable the jury to render a verdict") with Tex. R. Civ. P. 277 (1969) ("explanatory

instructions and such definitions of legal terms as shall be necessary to enable the jury to
properly pass upon and render a verdict").
228. See Gulf Coast State Bank v. Emenhiser, 562 S.W.2d 449, 453 (Tex. 1978); frick v.
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definitions and instructions must be correct even if the "necessary"
requirement has been omitted. As an example, causation in a suit
brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act121 should not be

submitted in terms of "proximate cause" because it imposes a
greater burden upon the plaintiff than the law permits, thereby
affecting the plaintiff's guaranteed federal substantive rights.2:"' In
addition, an instruction that misstates the law cannot be expected
to produce a correct verdict. For example, in the submission of a
negligence per se case, the judge may instruct the jury about the
statutory law 3' as long as the instruction is a correct statement of'
the law.232 In Jackson v. Fontaine's Clinics, Inc.,2 3 a case in which

the plaintiff charged defendants with conspiring to damage the
plaintiff's business and reputation, a damage issue was followed by
a meaningless instruction that "damages" meant "the loss of monetary reward."' 2 1Holding that the instruction permitted speculation
about losses outside the-pleadings and evidence, the supreme court
reversed the judgment because the instruction neither correctly nor
properly described "net profits," thereby failing to give the jury any
guidance regarding a proper legal measure of damages. 2 5 Finally,

the revised rule did not change the law that an instruction about a
Andrew, 545 S.W.2d 557, 559 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ ret'd n.r.e.);
Forney v. Memorial Hosp., 543 S.W.2d 705, 708 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); First State Bank & Trust Co. v. George, 519 S.W.2d 198, 207 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); cf. Wichita Valley Ry. v. Williams, 116 Tex. 253, 263, 288 S.W.
425, 428 (1926) (decided before amendment to rule 277).
In a deceptive trade practices suit, the jury need not be instructed that acts or practices
listed in the Consumer Protection Act are false, misleading, or deceptive. The only inquiry
is whether the acts or practices occurred; the statute declares and makes them false, misleading, or deceptive. See Spradling v. Williams, 566 S.W.2d 561, 562-64 (Tex. 1978).
In Dutton v. Southern Pac. Transp., 576 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. 1978), a Texas common law
definition of proximate cause was rejected in a F.E.L.A. case because it placed a greater
burden upon the plaintiff than federal law permits; it included the elements of
"foreseeability" and "new and independent cause." The correct definition was held to be:
.'Proximate Cause' means a cause which played any part, no matter how small, in actually
bringing about or causing the injury." See id. at 783, 786.
229. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1970).
230. See Arnold v. Panhandle & S.F. Ry., 353 U.S. 360, 361 (1957); Rogers v. Missouri
Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 507-08 (1957); Brown v. Western Ry., 338 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1949);
Dutton v. Southern Pac. Transp., 561 S.W.2d 892, 894 (Tex. 1978); Texas & Pac. Ry. v.
Younger, 262 S.W.2d 557, 560-61 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See
generally Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 553, 559 (1961).
231. Southern Pac. Co. v. Castro, 493 S.W.2d 491, 498 (Tex. 1973).
232. Id.at 498.
233. 499 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1973).
234. Id.at 89.
235. Id.at 90.
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statutory presumption only fixes the burden of producing evidence
and that it is not proper to explain the presumption to the jury. 3 '
An Instruction or Definition Should Enable the Jury To Render a
Verdict
Although the submission of instructions has been expanded to
give the trial judge more discretion in his use of instructions, this
discretion is not unfettered. Instructions are limited to those that
should enable the jury to render its verdict. The trial judge must
keep his eye upon the issue and the terms used in it, remembering
that it is the issue-not the result-about which the jury needs
assistance. For example, in Pittsburg Coca-Cola Bottling Works v.
Ponder,3 7 a strict liability action for damages resulting from an
exploding bottle, the court submitted an issue asking whether the
Coca-Cola bottle that exploded was unfit for the purposes for which
it was intended. The first special issue asked about the fitness of the
bottle and its contents, but the court gave the unnecessary instruction that a bottler of a product for human consumption impliedly
warrants that the product is reasonably fit for use. The instruction
also stated that "one who puts out as his own product and assembles
components thereof that may be manufactured by others may yet
be liable for defects" in the product.131 It is apparent that the instructions did not assist the jury in arriving at an answer to the
special issue asked; i.e. the fitness of the product. The court had no
occasion to instruct the jury about the general state of the law
regarding who is or who is not liable under product liability law. The
instruction aimed the jurors toward a result. The disapproved
charge was immaterial to the question that inquired about the existence of the defect and did not assist the jury in answering that
question.
The supreme court in a series of cases 39 has recognized actions
236. See Hailes v. Gentry, 520 S.W.2d 555, 558-59 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1975, no
writ); Armstrong v. West Tex. Rig Co., 339 S.W.2d 69, 74 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1960,
writ refd n.r.e.).
237. 443 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1969). Other similar examples are found in Union Oil Co. v.
Richard, 536 S.W.2d 955, 957-58 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, no writ); Colinburg v.
George, 519 S.W.2d 198, 207 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); DeViney
v. McLendon, 496 S.W.2d 161, 166 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Levermann v. Cartall, 393 S.W.2d 931, 935 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
238. Pittsburg Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Ponder, 443 S.W.2d 546, 550 (Tex. 1969).
239. Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979); General Motors
Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977); Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d
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grounded upon defective design as a form of product liability, but
has had difficulty in arriving at an instruction of the term defective
design that it considers helpful to a jury. In General Motors Corp.
v. Hopkins '0 the court said that unreasonable risk of harm as applied to the design of a product meant
that the product, as manufactured according to such design, threatens harm to persons using the product to the extent that any product
so designed would not be placed in the channels of commerce by a
prudent manufacturer aware of the risks involved in its use, and to
the extent that the product so manufactured would not meet the
reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer as to safety.2 1'

The test was a bifurcated one that looked to either of the stated
alternatives. The court was then confronted in Turner v. General
Motors Corp.2 12 with an instruction that omitted any mention of the

alternative about a prudent manufacturer, aware of the risks, placing the automobile in the channels of commerce. In Turner the trial
court had defined "unreasonably dangerous" by use of only one part
of the bifurcated test, that is, the term meant "dangerous to an
extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common
to the community as to its characteristics." The supreme court
approved the instruction because it was consistent with what the
court stated in Hopkins, but stated that in future design defect
cases the Hopkins instruction would no longer be applicable.2

;1

In

future cases, the instruction would be:
By the term "defectively designed" as used in this issue is meant a
product that is unreasonably dangerous as designed, taking into consideration the utility of the product and the risk involved in its use. 21

This short instruction about defective design permits the jury to
balance the risk and utility of the product. The significance of the
holding, however, is accented by the court's rejection of the more
elaborate set of instructions suggested by the court of civil appeals
that required the jurors to balance the following factors:
87 (Tex.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

1974).
548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977).
Id. at 347 n.1.
584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
Id. at 847, 851.
Id. at 847 n.1.
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(1) the utility of the product to the user and to the public as a whole
weighed against the gravity and likelihood of injury from its use;
(2) the availability of a substitute product which would meet the
same need and not be unsafe or unreasonably expensive;
(3) the manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of
the product without seriously impairing its usefulness or significantly
increasing its costs;
(4) the user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the
product and their avoidability because of general public knowledge
of the obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable
2
warnings or instructions .

Another example of instructions that did not assist the jury in
answering the issue is found in Union Oil Co. v. Richard,245 a case
in which a seaman sued his employer pursuant to the Jones Act. 47
The broad issues submitted to the jury asked whether the plaintiff
was injured, if the defendant failed to provide plaintiff a reasonably
safe place to work, whether that failure was a producing cause of the
injuries, and whether the deck on which plaintiff slipped was rea-

sonably fit for its intended use. The trial court correctly refused to
give a number of collateral instructions that had been requested by
2 8
the defendant.
In De Viney v. McLendon"' an instruction about sudden emergency was held to be of no assistance to a jury and actually counterproductive since there was no evidence of any sudden emergency. 50
An instruction about a matter, however interesting, that is irrele245. General Motors Corp. v. Turner, 567 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. Civ. App.- Beaumont
1978), rev'd, 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
246. 536 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, no writ).
247. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
248. See Union Oil Co. v. Richard, 536 S.W.2d 955, 958 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1975, no writ) (must exclude anything, no matter how relevant, that does not aid jury in
answering issues). The refused instructions were:
[Diefendant is not obligated to provide an accident-proof ship; the mere occurrence
of an accident does not raise any inference or presumption of negligence or unseaworthiness; defendant's obligation was only to furnish a vessel and equipment reasonably
fit for its intended use; an undiscoverable amount of oil on a grating would not automatically create an unseaworthy condition if such was normal and necessary; that it
is a fact of common knowledge that in almost every occupation aboard ship there is
some inherent and unavoidable risk; that a corporation is entitled to a fair trial on the
same basis as a private individual; and that plaintiff must prove the causal relationship between the incidents of February 4 and February 7, 1971, and his present complaints, concerning which the evidence must be more than speculation or conjecture.
Id. at 957.
249. 496 S.W.2d 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
250. Id. at 166.
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vant to the issue put to a jury has never been regarded as an aid to
the jury."5 ' On the other hand, courts have recently ruled that juries
are assisted by proper definitions or instructions explaining terms
used in the charge. Terms that recently have received explanation
include self-defense, ' good cause,6 3 due diligence, 54 fraud,5 ' nuis'
res ipsa loquitur,55 employee, 201 attorney
ance, ' 56 Act of God,25

fees, ' "horseplay" in a worker compensation case,26 ' injury," and
occupational disease. '
An Instruction or Definition Should Not Directly Advise the Jury
of the Effect of Their Answers
Revised rule 277 retained the prohibition against telling jurors the
effect of their answers but relaxed the rule by permitting incidental
comments as distinguished from direct comments. An incidental
comment is permissible when it is a proper part of an instruction
or definition. A decision whether or not the instruction or definition
is permissible, of course, pertains to judicial discretion, and the
courts, including the supreme court, properly accord trial courts a
reasonable discretion concerning comments.2 4 The court, however,
251. See G.

HODGES, SPECIAL ISSUE SUBMISSION IN TEXAS § 8 (1959).
In Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 853 (Tex. 1979), the supreme court
disapproved an instruction that an award of damages to a plaintiff was exempt from federal
income taxation as improper saying it introduced a collateral matter into the damage issue.
252. Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925, 929-30 (Tex. 1977); see Grieger v. Vega, 153 Tex.
498, 504, 271 S.W.2d 85, 88-89 (1954).
253. Scott v. Ingle Bros. Pac., Inc., 489 S.W.2d 554, 557 (Tex. 1972).
254. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. Gladys City Co., 506 S.W.2d 281, 288-89 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
255. Shasteen v. Mid-Continent Refrigerator Co., 517 S.W.2d 437, 438-39 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
256. City of Lubbock v. Tice, 517 S.W.2d 428, 431 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no
writ).
257. Scott v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 572 S.W.2d 273, 279 (Tex. 1978).
258. Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 256-57 (Tex. 1974).
259. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Steele, 570 S.W.2d 213, 216-17 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
260. Fox v. Boese, 566 S.W.2d 682, 686 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
261. Mejia v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 544 S.W.2d 690, 692 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1976, no writ).
262. Teague v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 548 S.W.2d 957, 959 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
263. Transportation Ins. Co. v. Maksyn, 580 S.W.2d 334, 337 (Tex. 1979).
264. See Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 256 (Tex. 1974); Herrera v. Balmorhea Feeders, Inc., 539 S.W.2d 84, 87 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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must be careful not to give a direct instruction about the effect of
an answer.
Advocates have increasingly urged trial judges to add words to
standard and settled instructions as a means for telling jurors the
effect of their answers. The argument advanced for the additional
instructions is that it makes the definition or instruction meaningful; otherwise, it is urged, nothing is submitted to the jury that is
helpful. Faced with these arguments, a trial court is nevertheless
still prohibited from directly informing the jury of the effect of their
answer. Although there is precedent among pre-1973 cases outside
the field of negligence law, which moderately tolerates this practice,"25 and although under the present rule the trial court has discretion concerning the form and content of instructions, a direct instruction about the effect of an answer remains impermissible.""
In Scott v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry.26" the trial court had
submitted, among others, the instruction that "[a]n occurrence
may be an 'Act of God', that is, an event not caused in whole or in
part by the negligence of any party." ' 8 Counsel for the defendant
railroad argued that the instruction was meaningless since it failed
to advise the jury "what the effect would be of a determination by
them that Scott's injuries were caused by the 'Act of God'. 26 9 Although the supreme court did not specifically address the stated
objection, the objection is invalid because it violates the prohibition
found in rule 277 against telling jurors the effect of their answers.20
265. See Grieger v. Vega, 153 Tex. 498, 502-03, 271 S.W.2d 85, 87 (1954) (wrongful killing
and self-defense); Pearson v. Doherty, 143 Tex. 64, 70-71, 183 S.W.2d 453, 456 (1944) (adverse
possession); Viduarri v. Bruni, 179 S.W.2d 818, 823-24 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1944,
writ ref d w.o.m.) (trespass to try title and adverse possession).
266. Tax. R. Civ. P. 277; see Scott v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 572 S.W.2d 273, 280 (Tex.
1978); Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 256 (Tex. 1974); cf. Pittsburg Coca-Cola
Bottling Works v. Ponder, 443 S.W.2d 546, 550 (Tex. 1969) (decided before revision of rule
277). See generally Figari, Texas Civil Procedure,Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J.
248, 259-60 (1974); Pope & Lowerre, Revised Rule 277-A Better Special Verdict System for
Texas, 27 Sw. L.J. 577, 588-89 (1973).
267. 572 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. 1978).
268. Id. at 279.
269. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Scott, 551 S.W.2d 740, 743 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1977), aff'd, 572 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. 1978).
270. See McLeroy v. Stocker, 505 S.W.2d 615, 618-19 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston lst
Dist.] 1974, no writ). In McLeroy the court of civil appeals disapproved of a statement that
had been added by the trial court to its instruction. In its instruction the trial court told the
jury: "Thus, if in your deliberation you determine that the occurrence in question was not
proximately caused by negligence of any party to the event, you shall answer all of the issues
of this charge inquiring about 'negligence or negligent acts' of the plaintiff and the defendant
'we do not'." Id. at 617.
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Nevertheless, the court did strike down the instruction because it
actually describes "unavoidable accident" rather than "Act of
God.

'27'

In suggesting to the bench and bar a manner in which "Act

of God" might be submitted to the jury, the court included the
following instruction at the end of its explanation of an "Act of
God:"
[Yjou are instructed that an occurrence is not caused in whole or in
part by
the negligence of any party if it is due solely to an 'Act of
272
God.

Arguably, even that instruction suggests to a jury the effect of its
answers, but this advice is considered incidental rather than direct.
Instructions that array the evidence should also be avoided. The
discredited statutory rule that required separate and distinct issues
was a response to the frequent reversals attributed to trial courts'
efforts to marshall or array the evidence in charging jurors. Under
this former practice, the court would summarize the evidence and
then instruct the jurors that if they believed the stated set of facts
to be true, they must find for a certain party.27 3 The charge under
this practice was given in substantially this form: If you believe
(fact 1) and (fact 2) and (fact 3), then you will answer the special
issues "We do not" or "For the defendant." The courts using that
charge were reversed many times because of omissions, inclusions,
and misstatements of the facts and law. In response to these numerous reversals the legislature passed article 1984a in 1913, which
required issues to be submitted "distinctly and separately.

2 74

Re-

cently, this abandoned practice of marshalling the facts reappeared
and by dictum was expressly disapproved by the supreme court in
Gulf Coast State Bank v. Emenhiser"7 because the charge was a
comment on the evidence and advised the jurors of the effect of their
7

answers.2 6
271. Scott v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 572 S.W.2d 273, 280 (Tex. 1978).
272. Id. at 280 (footnote omitted).
273. See Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Rogers, 91 Tex. 52, 55-56, 40 S.W. 956, 957-58 (1897);
Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. McGlamory, 89 Tex. 635, 638-39, 35 S.W. 1058, 1059 (1896); Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Jeanes, 88 Tex. 230, 232, 31 S.W. 186, 187 (1895); Houston, E. & W.T. Ry.
v. Lynch, 208 S.W. 714, 723 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1919, no writ); Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry.
v. Hamilton, 28 S.W. 906, 907-08 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894, no writ). See generally Pope &
Lowerre, Revised Rule 277-A Better Special Verdict System ForTexas, 27 Sw. L.J. 577, 58889 (1973).
274. 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 59, § 1, at 113.
275. 562 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. 1978).
276. See id. at 453. The defective charge, in pertinent part, stated:
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The Court Should Not Directly Comment on the Weight of the
Evidence
The trial court, whether by an issue, definition, or instruction,
should not directly include a comment on the evidence, but the
court may do so incidentally.277 In City of Pearlandv. Alexander,2
an eminent domain case, the trial court improperly commented on
the disputed evidence when it instructed the jury that the condemning municipality "will exercise its rights" to the fullest extent permissible.2 1 City of Pearlandwas decided before the revision of rule
277, but the instruction is also defective under the revised rule.2 0 A
similar error was committed in another condemnation case,
Gleghorn v. City of Wichita Falls.2 81 The condemnors had taken a
flowage easement over a part of Gleghorn's land. The evidence
showed, however, that flooding would occur only infrequently. The
supreme court upheld the reversal by the court of civil appeals
because the trial court had submitted an instruction that the land
"is to be used for the purpose of being submerged by water. ' 1 2 The
instruction was a comment on the weight of the evidence.
DEVELOPING SUBSTANTIVE LAW LEAVES PROCEDURES UNCERTAIN

The procedures employed during trials necessarily depend upon
the rights, defenses, and standards established by the substantive
law.28 3 Consequently, many of the present procedural problems may
be traced to the expanding new fields of substantive law. Both the
Texas Legislature and the courts have been active in the creation
of new rights. Recent significant legislation includes such topics as
comparative negligence, 24 consumer protection in all of its varied
If you should find that had the Gulf Coast State Bank at Winnie mailed the draft in
question direct [sic] to Louisiana Bank and Trust Company, Crowley, Louisiana, for
presentment and such would have been presented at a time when the draft would have
been paid or would have been held by the Louisiana Bank for more than twenty-four
(24) hours after presentment, then you will find for the Doornbos Defendants and the
Emenhiser Defendants in this case.
Id. at 453.
277. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277; see Briseno v. Martin, 561 S.W.2d 794, 796-97 (Tex. 1977).
278. 483 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. 1972).
279. Id. at 248-49 (emphasis added).
280. See Gleghorn v. City of Wichita Falls, 545 S.W.2d 446, 447 (Tex. 1976).
281. Id. at 447-48.
282. Id. at 447-48.
283. See Green, Strict Liability Under Sections 402A and 402B: A Decade of Litigation,
54 TEXAs L. REv. 1185, 1187 (1976).
284. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
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facets,"8 ' medical malpractice, 8 the Texas Tort Claims Act, 8 7 and

the Equal Rights Amendment to the Texas Constitution. 8 Opinions of the Texas appellate courts also have recognized new rights
that are worthy of protection. In 1967, the supreme court embraced
product liability law by its acceptance of section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. 8 ' The court at first eroded8 0 and
then repudiated the doctrine of charitable immunity."' Recent decisions have approved actions based on the right of privacy, 22 the loss
of consortium,29 3 suits for criminal conversation,8 ' and the protection of an implied warranty of habitability by a landlord." 5 The
court also has abolished the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity
for willful or intentional torts." These changes in the substantive
law will have a significant impact on courthouse procedures in general and jury charges in particular. The impact of these changes and
the effect they may have on the jury charge can best be recognized
through consideration of a few examples.
ComparativeNegligence
The comparative negligence statute,8 ' while simplifying trials of
285. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-63 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979) (Deceptive
Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-2.01 to 8.06
(Vernon 1971 & Supp. 1978-1979) (Consumer Credit Code); id. art. 5069-11.01 to 11.11 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979) (debt collection practices); id. art. 5069-13.01 to 13.06 (Vernon Supp.
1978-1979) (home solicitation transactions); id. art. 5069-14.01 to 14.28 (Vernon Supp. 19781979) (consumer credit disclosure requirements); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. arts. 20A.14 & 20A.20
(Vernon Supp. 1963-1978) (prohibited practices and suspension of certificate of authority
under the Texas Health Maintenance Organization Act); id. art. 21.21-2 (Vernon Supp.
1963-1978) (unfair claim settlement practices under the Unfair Claims Settlement Practice
Act). See generally Consumer Law Symposium, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 609 (1977).
286. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979) (Medical Liability
and Insurance Improvement Act of Texas).
287. Id. art. 6252-19 (Vernon 1970).
288. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a. For a review of Texas appellate court decisions through
1977 interpreting the Texas Equal Rights Amendment, see Schoen, The Texas Equal Rights
Amendment in the Courts - 1972-1977:A Review and Proposed Principlesof Interpretation,
15 Hous. L. REV. 537 (1978).
289. See McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tex. 1967);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
290. See Watkins v. Southcrest Baptist Church, 399 S.W.2d 530, 534-35 (Tex. 1966).
291. See Howle v. Camp Amon Carter, 470 S.W.2d 629, 630 (Tex. 1971).
292. See Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858, 859-60 (Tex. 1973).
293. See Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 668 (Tex. 1978).
294. See Felsenthal v. McMillan, 493 S.W.2d 729, 730 (Tex. 1973).
295. See Kamarath v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658, 660-61 (Tex. 1978).
296. See Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex. 1977).
297. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol11/iss1/1

46

Pope and Lowerre: The State of the Special Verdict - 1979.

19791

SPECIAL VERDICT-1979

negligence cases, has added procedural complexities to product liability cases that are yet to be resolved. Article 2212a authorizes a
comparison of the negligence of the participants; but, since no negligence issue is present in a product liability case, there can be no
apportionment pursuant to the statute when a codefendant is found
to be strictly liable. The supreme court by its decision in General
Motors Corp. v. Hopkins '9" recognized a supplier's liability for
supplying a defective product that was a producing cause of an
injury. ' The plaintiff's misuse or alteration of the product, however, can be a concurring cause with the defect. 00 In Hopkins the
court fashioned a rather awkward method for pure comparison of
the effect of the product's defect with the effect of the plaintiffs
misuse or alteration-comparative causation.3 01 To achieve apportionment between the plaintiff and defendant the product defect
must be a producing cause, but the consumer's misuse or alteration
must be a concurring proximate cause.302 The procedural problems
298. 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977).
299. Id. at 351.
300. Id. at 349.
301. Id. at 352. The court summarized the comparison test as follows:
To recapitulate, if the product is found to have been unreasonably dangerous when
the defendant placed it in the stream of commerce, and if that defect is found to have
been a producing cause of the damaging event, and if the plaintiff has misused the
product in the sense as defined by the trial court in its charge in the present case, and
if that misuse is a proximate cause of the damaging event, the trier of fact must then
determine the respective percentages (totalling 100%) by which these two concurring
causes contributed to bring about the event. This comparison and division of causes
is not to be confused with the statutory scheme of modified comparative negligence
which bars all recovery to the plaintiff if his negligence is greater than the negligence
of the parties against whom recovery is sought. [Citation omitted.] The defense in a
products liability case, where both defect and misuse contribute to cause the damaging
event, will limit the plaintiff's recovery to that portion of his damages equal to the
percentage of the cause contributed by the product defect.
Id. at 352. Messrs. Heft and Heft, in their manual on comparative negligence, recognized the
distinction between "pure" and "modified" comparative negligence when they concluded
that, of those states that have adopted a form of comparative negligence, either by legislative
or judicial action, the doctrine usually has emerged in one of three forms, either in its "pure"
form or one of the two modified forms. See C. HErr & C. HEFr, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
MANUAL, Appendix II (rev. 1978). The pure form of comparative negligence allows recovery
by a plaintiff as long as the defendant is found to be guilty of some percentage of negligence,
no matter how small. The plaintiff's recovery will, of course, be diminished by his degree of
contributory negligence. Id. at § 1.50. Of the two modified forms, the first permits a plaintiff
to recover as long as his negligence is less than 50% of the total negligence. The second form,
and the one adopted by Texas, permits recovery for the plaintiff as long as his negligence is
not in excess of 50% of the total negligence. Id. at § 1.40; see Comment, Multiple Party
Litigation in Comparative Negligence: Incomplete Resolution of Joinder and Settlement
Problems, 32 Sw. L.J. 669, 669 n.3 (1978).
302. General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 351 (Tex. 1977).
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generated by this state of the substantive law are apparent. Under
the rule announced in Hopkins, the plaintiff who has misused or
altered the product may recover against the supplier for the percent
of injury caused by the product defect, no matter how small; however, article 2212a, which applies only to negligence cases, does not
permit apportionment between a negligent defendant and a strictly
liable defendant. Thus, comparing negligence under article 2212a
and comparing causation in product liability cases creates an unfortunate complexity of issues.
Another complicating factor is that section 2 of article 2212a expressly authorizes contribution among negligent tortfeasors but fails
to allocate damages when one of the defendants is found to be
strictly liable. 03 The statute affords no mechanism for comparing
the causative fault of a strictly liable manufacturer with the negligent conduct of a negligent codefendant. 0 The supreme court invited the legislature's attention to these problems in General Motors
Corp. v. Simmons. °5
The Sixty-Sixth Legislature, however, defeated legislation that
would have provided for comparative fault in product liability suits.
House Bill 1161, as originally introduced, incorporated most of the
proposals of the House Joint Study Committee.0 It prohibited actions in strict liability based upon a defectively designed product
and provided for comparative fault that permitted a claimant to
303. See TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
304. See id. This result is to be compared with the result in causes of action arising before
the effective date of the comparative negligence statute. In these earlier cases the division of
damages was controlled by TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212 (1971), as interpreted in
Palestine Contractors, Inc. v. Perkins, 386 S.W.2d 764, 767-68 (Tex. 1964). See General
Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 862 (Tex. 1977).
305. 558 S.W.2d 855, 863 (Tex. 1977). The legislature responded by including the subject
in its interim study and report concerning the subject of product liability. See HOUSE JOINT
STUDY COMM. ON PRODUcTS LIABILITY, 65TH LEGISLATURE OF TEXAS, INTERIM REPORT ON PRO-

DUCTS LIABILITY 70 (1978). The report's recommendation was to compare fault. Id. at 80.
Senate Bill 135, introduced in the 66th Legislature, was derived from sample legislation suggested by the report. The suggested legislation broadly defines fault and then provides:
(b) Except for a suit based on intentional tort, liability in a products liability suit
shall be determined by comparing the fault chargeable to the claimant with the fault
chargeable to all others contributing to cause the harm whether or not they are parties
to the suit, and except as otherwise specifically provided in this section, each defendant in the suit, on a decision in favor of the claimant, is liable for damages in
proportion to the percentage of fault attributed to that defendant.
Id. at 87.
306. See H.B. 1161, 66th Legislature of Texas, Regular Sess. (1979). House Bill 1161 had
its first reading in the House on February 21, 1979, and was referred to the Committee on
State Affairs. House Bills on First Reading, TEx. H.R.J. 442 (1979).
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recover unless his fault was greater in degree than the fault of all
defendants. Under that original proposal, misuse, alteration or
modification, and conformity with the state of the art, as defined
in the bill, were absolute defenses. Punitive damages were prohibited in product liability suits.
The House Committee Substitute for House Bill 1161 was the
product of the give and take of the strong forces that were seeking
strict liability legislation. 07 The substitute bill broadly defined fault
to include strict liability, negligence, and breach of express or implied warranty. It provided for contribution in proportion to the
percentage of fault attributable to each defendant, provided the
claimant's fault did not exceed the total fault of all defendants. The
committee substitute eliminated the provisions for total defenses,
except the defense of state of the art.
Several floor amendments were adopted by the House, 0 8 including one that permitted recovery of damages as diminished by the
amount of fault attributed to the claimant, even though the claimant's fault may be greater than the fault of the defendants. The
House Committee Substitute, as amended and sent to the Senate,
provided that a finding that the elimination of the defect upon
which recovery was sought was beyond the state of the art at the
time of the manufacture, design, or marketing would be conclusive
that the product, design, warning, or instruction was not defective.
The bill also included extensive provisions concerning product liability insurance.
The Senate Committee Substitute for House Bill 1161 stripped
back the House version to the original broadly defined comparative
fault.0 9 The state of the art proposal, as a total and conclusive
defense, was retained by the Senate Committee. The Senate substitute permitted recovery only if the fault of the claimant was not
greater than the fault of the defendants. The Senate, however, refused by a vote of 19-12 (two votes short) to suspend the regular
307. The substitute bill was reported out of committee on May 4, 1979. Standing Committee Reports, TEX. H.R.J. 2417 (1979). The complete text of the Committee Substitute for
H.B. 1161 is reported at H.B. 1161 on Second Reading, TEX. H.R.J. 2551-52 (1979).
308. See H.B. 1161 on Second Reading, TEx. H.R.J. 2557-58 (1979). House Bill 1161 was
passed as amended on third reading. See H.B. 1161 on Third Reading, TEX. H.R.J. 2671-72
(1979).
309. See Senate Comm. Substitute for H.B. 1161, 66th Legislature of Texas, Regular
Sess. (1979). The bill had its first reading in the Senate on May 11, 1979, and was referred to
the Committee on Economic Development. House Bills on First Reading, TEX. S.J. 1146
(1979). It was reported out of committee on May 17, 1979. Reports of Standing Committees,
TEx. S.J. 1328 (1979).
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order of business to consider the bill in the closing hours of the
Sixty-Sixth Legislature."' The legislative story portrays a serious
policy struggle and, despite the failure to produce a product, it
manifests the broad range of policy agreement and the narrower
range of disagreement.
Inevitably, there will emerge some means of comparing fault,
whether the fault be grounded on a negligence, product liability,
warranty, or other theory. The Texas Legislature's failure to respond to the supreme court's invitation to resolve the problem has
postponed a clearer understanding of the substantive rights to contribution. Additionally, the bench and bar today are at the same
stage of uncertainty about absolute defenses to suits in strict liability that they were in 1973 about the several absolute defenses to
negligence cases. The question whether voluntary assumption of
risk is a complete defense in negligence cases was answered in
Farley,3"' but the defense has survived in strict liability cases. ' ,'
The combination of old and new substantive theories of recovery
with the existence of the allocation problems in strict liability has
given rise to a new phenomenon. A plaintiff may plead his case
alternatively upon grounds of negligence, strict liability, breach of
warranty, and a violation of consumer protection rights. The different theories, sounding in both tort and contract law, throw a massive conceptual burden not only upon the attorneys and the trial
judge, but also upon lay jurors. Having almost escaped the multitude of issues that once surrounded negligence cases, the bar is now
faced with a multitude of new theories of action. Dean Page Keeton
has expressed the view that the mixing of several theories in a
single lawsuit has resulted in such complexity that there should be
a single theory of recovery. 3 Likewise Dean Leon Green had previously noted that much of the confusion could be eliminated by
restricting the trial to a single action." ' Regretfully, no one appears
to be addressing the merits of this suggestion at the present time.
310. Motion to Place Committee Substitute House Bill 1161 on Second Reading, TEx.
S.J. 1376 (1979).
311. Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 758 (Tex. 1975).
312. See Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 800 (Tex. 1975); Henderson v. Ford Motor
Co., 519 S.W.2d 87, 90-91 (Tex. 1974). See generally Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 1, 11-14 (1978).
313. Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1978).
314. Green, Strict Liability Under Sections 402A and 402B: A Decade of Litigation, 54
TEXAs L. REV. 1185, 1192, 1211-12 (1976); see Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacyof
Information, 48 TEXAS L. REV. 398, 409 (1970). In his article Dean Keeton states,
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Consumer Protection
The Deceptive Trade Practice-Consumer Protection Act," 5
effective May 21, 1973, has been described as "probably the most
far-reaching legislation that has been enacted in Texas since the
adoption of the English common law in 1840." 'l Much of today's
consumer law is related to the doctrine of strict liability. Both strict
liability and recent consumer protection laws are forms of the
maxim caveat venditor.17 The Deceptive Trade Practices Act is
popular because it provides for the recovery of damages, treble damages in some circumstances, and attorney fees by a consumer who
has been adversely affected by the use of any false, misleading, or
deceptive act or practice in the conduct of any trade or commerce. ' "
My principal thesis is and has been that theories of negligence should be avoided
altogether in the products liability area in order to simplify the law, and that if the
sale of a product is made under circumstances that would subject someone to an
unreasonablerisk in fact, liability for harm resulting from those risks should follow.
Id. at 409 (original emphasis). He adds in a footnote: "There is no longer any reason to
complicate a trial by submitting a case to the jury on negligence and warranty theories, and
a trial judge would not err in refusing to do so." Id. at 409 n.25. But cf. Mather v. Caterpillar
Tractor Corp., 533 P.2d 717, 720 n.1 (Ariz. App. 1975) (sometimes case should be submitted
on both strict liability and negligence); Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 482 P.2d 681, 686,
93 Cal. Rptr. 769, 774-75 (1971) (sometimes beneficial to plaintiff to submit both strict
liability and negligence issues). It is a common practice in Texas to combine the several
theories of action in a single suit.
315. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
316. Singleton v. Pennington, 568 S.W.2d 382, 385 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ
filed) (on motion to dismiss).
317. See generally Maleson, Negligence Is Dead But Its Doctrines Rule Us From the
Grave: A Proposal To Limit Defendant's Responsibility in Strict Products Liaiblity Actions
Without Resort to Proximate Cause, 51 TEMP. L.Q. 1, 5-13 (1978).
318. See Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662, 671 (Tex. 1977); TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE
ANN. § 17.50 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979). The 66th Legislature, apparently in response to the
large number of cases that are being filed pursuant to the Deceptive Trade Practices Act,
has passed, and the Governor has signed, Senate Bill 357, amending the Act. 1979 Tex. Sess.
Law Serv., ch. 603, § 1, at 1327 (Vernon). The 1979 amendments purport to limit the applicability of the Act in many respects. Among other things, a consumer may now recover damages, pursuant to section 17.50, for "false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices" only
when those acts or practices are included within the laundry list found in section 17.46(b).
Id. § 4, at 1329. The amount of recoverable damages has been reduced greatly by eliminating the treble damage requirement and substituting a recovery of two times that portion
of the actual damages that does not exceed $1,000. It is only when the conduct of the defendant was committed "knowingly" that the trier of fact may treble the damage award. Id.
§ 4, at 1330. In addition, it now appears to be a total defense to a damage claim when the
defendant proves, inter alia, either that he relied upon certain false or inaccurate written
information relating to the goods or services in question when the information was received
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With the definition of a "consumer" expanded to include any
"individual, partnership, corporation, or governmental entity who
' the
seeks or acquires by purchase or lease, any goods or services,"319
Deceptive Trade Practices Act is now being applied to an ever in2 0 In addition, with the deletion
creasing number of transactions.Y
of
a definition of "merchant," there should no longer be any doubt that
the Act now applies to purely commercial transactions as well as
those types of transactions that would normally come to mind when
one hears the term "consumer protection." 321 At least one writer has
written that the Act "would seem to apply to literally anyone who
sells or leases goods or services to anyone else." ' Although this Act
potentially covers almost every sale or lease of goods and services
in Texas and although much writing has occurred during the past
five or six years regarding the substantive aspects of the law, relatively few decisions have been written concerning the special issues
to be used in trials of consumer cases. 323 One unsolved problem is
the difficulty that arises from mixing tort with contract actions.32
In the jury charge for the ordinary consumer case, however, the
same principles stated in Mobil Chemical concerning broad issues
3 5
will apply.
from official government records or another source, or that he relied upon written information when it concerns a test required or prescribed by a government agency. Id. § 6, at 1331.
319. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
320. See generally Bragg, Now We're All Consumers! The 1975 Amendments to the
Consumer Protection Act, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 1 (1976). One limitation that courts appear to
apply to cases brought pursuant to the Deceptive Trade Practices Act is that, in order to be
a "consumer," one must have either purchased or leased the goods from the defendant. See
Exxon Corp. v. Dunn, 581 S.W.2d 500, 501 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ); Russell
v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 548 S.W.2d 737, 741 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
321. See Singleton v. Pennington, 568 S.W.2d 367, 376 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977,
writ filed) (on motion for rehearing); Comment, What Hath the Legislature Wrought? A
Critique of the Deceptive Trade PracticesAct as Amended in 1977, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 525,
525-531 (1977).
. 322. Comment, What Hath the Legislature Wrought? A Critique of the Deceptive Trade
PracticesAct as Amended in 1977, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 525, 531 (1977). One possible exception to this statement might occur when the alleged wrongdoer is a governmental body that
is entitled to the defense of sovereign immunity. See id. at 527.
323. See generally Spradling v. Williams, 566 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1978).
324. Compare Nobility Homes, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 79-80 (Tex. 1977) with
Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv., Inc., 572 S.W.2d 308, 311-12
(Tex. 1978) and Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Prods., 572 S.W.2d 320, 324-25 (Tex.
1978).
325. See Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 256 (Tex. 1974). One suggested set
of court charges for consumer actions is contained in D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL, J. LONGLEY,
TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION §§ 9.01-.35 (1978).
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In Spradling v. Williams ' the supreme court recognized that
section 17.46 of the Consumer Protection Act, which lists the statutory violations, excuses the submission of an issue inquiring whether
the act or practice was "false, misleading, or deceptive" because the
statute declares it to be.3" The correct issue is one that asks whether
the defendant violated the provision, followed by the issues on caus32
ation and damages. 1
A very significant development in the relations between sellers
and buyers was the supreme court's decision in Signal Oil & Gas Co.
v. Universal Oil Products. 32 1 Signal Oil sued three defendants, and
it alternatively alleged actions in negligence, strict liability, and
breach of an implied warranty under the Texas Business and Commerce Code. 330 Signal's suit was to recover damages to its refinery
that it alleged was destroyed by reason of the defects in the manufacture, design, and/or installation of an isomax reactor charge
heater. Jury findings defeated Signal's negligence and strict liability
findings, but the supreme court reversed the judgments of the trial
court and court of civil appeals and remanded the cause for a retrial
3
on the implied warranty action. '
The jury in Signal Oil found that two of the defendants, Alcorn
Combustion Company and Procon, Inc., had failed to erect a heater
that was reasonably suited for its intended use or purpose and that
the unsuitability was a proximate cause of the rupture that caused
the fire. The basis for the denial of Signal's recovery in the courts
below was the jury's additional finding that Signal Oil was contributorily negligent. The supreme court rejected the argument that contributory negligence is an absolute and total defense to an action for
breach of an implied warranty of fitness or suitability. The court,
as it had done earlier in the case of strict liability in General Motors
Corp. v. Hopkins, 33 fashioned a system of pure comparative liability. The cause was remanded with instruction that on retrial the
court should make a determination of the percentage of the concurring cause that contributed to the consequential damages. A seller
326. 566 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1978).
327. Id. at 563-64.
328. See D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL, J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION § 9.02 (1978).
The authors suggest that while the language of the statute may be changed to fit the evidence
in a particular case, the statute should be followed as closely as possible.
329. 572 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1978).'
330. Id. at 322; see TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.314-.315 (Vernon 1968).
331. Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Prods., 572 S.W.2d 320, 331 (Tex. 1978).
332. 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977).
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is liable for that part of the damages caused by the breach of implied
warranty but not for that part of the damages proximately caused
by the buyer's "negligence or fault.""33
Texas now has a confusing system of comparing negligence under
the modified comparative negligence statute334 and a system of pure
comparison of causation in strict liability and implied warranty
cases. The court in Signal did not have before it issues that would
clarify the extent to which assumption of risk, misuse, and alteration would afford defenses to a suit for breach of implied warranty.
Medical Malpractice
The Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act 335 was a
legislative response to an outcry over dramatic increases in premiums that physicians were having to pay for malpractice insurance. 336 The act addressed both substantive and procedural law
and changed the applicable statute of limitations by discarding the
court-adopted discovery rule 3 7 and adopting a rigid two-year limitation period from the occurrence of the alleged negligent act. 33 1 The
act limits recovery of damages to $500,000331 as well as the use of res
ipsa loquitur when used against physicians and those who provide
health care. 3 0 The act also requires the inclusion of certain instructions in the court's charge to the jury. Section 11.02(d) states that
the charge shall include an instruction stating, "Do not consider,
discuss, nor speculate whether or not liability, if any on the part of
any party is or is not subject to any limit under applicable law." '3 '
In the absence of this instruction one can only speculate why the
jurors would even think that such limitations might be present. The
333. Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Prods., 572 S.W.2d 320, 329 (Tex. 1978).
334. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
335. Id. art. 4590i.
336. Id. art. 4590i, § 1.02(7). See generally Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical
Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Constitutional Implications, 55 ThxAs L. REv. 759, 759-61
(1977).
337. The supreme court has defined the discovery rule as "the legal principle that a
statute of limitations barring prosecution of an action for medical malpractice runs, not from
the date of the practitioner's wrongful act or omission, but from the date the nature of the
injury was or should have been discovered by the plaintiff." Weaver v. Witt, 561 S.W.2d 792,
793-94 (Tex. 1977) (negligent surgical operation); see Hays v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412, 413-14
(Tex. 1972) (vasectomy); Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577, 580-81 (Tex. 1967) (failure to
remove surgical sponge).
338. See TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
339. See id. § 11.02.
340. See id. § 7.01.
341. Id. § 11.02(d).
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legislature also has provided that, in a case grounded upon the
failure of a physician to disclose adequately to his patient the risks
involved in some medical procedure, the court is required to include
an instruction advising the jury that a rebuttable presumption arises from either the physician's compliance or his failure to comply
with the disclosure procedure that has been established by the
Texas Medical Disclosure Panel. 342 None of these statutory changes
in medical malpractice law, however, prohibit a medical malpractice case from being submitted on a broad issue. In a recent malpractice suit a broad issue was permitted that inquired whether the
doctor "was negligent in his diagnosis and/or medical care and
treatment of Joe Bert Andrews, Jr., deceased, after the operation in
43
3
question."
CONCLUSION

Since its revision in 1973, rule 277 has eliminated many special
issues that were too narrowly drawn. Broad and global issues may
now be submitted. Consequently, conflicting jury answers, appeals,
and retrials have been avoided. Trial judges, armed with more discretion in the submission of issues, are better able to command the
form that the court's charge will take, knowing that there is more
than one fair way to try a case. Advocacy and oral argument have
found room for a rebirth and should be more generally relied upon
to supplant a multitude of issues and unnecessary instructions since
almost all allegedly necessary instructions can be adequately handled by argument. Even with these advancements, however, the
rapidly developing substantive law supplies the bench and bar with
ambiguities bringing new pressures upon the procedural system.
Long-standing practices, even bad ones, and mind-sets that have
3
been molded by several generations of teaching are slow to die. "1
Dean Green once wrote,
342. Id. § 6.07.
343. Lee v. Andrews, 545 S.W.2d 238, 247 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, writ dism'd).
344. Dean Leon Green has listed several of the obstacles to finding a satisfactory submission method: (1) usually there is no general agreement on what the issues should be in a
negligence suit; (2) tort law is always changing; (3) the litigants usually press the trial judge
to submit every facet of favorable factual data; (4) the litigants frequently prefer multiple
issues and instructions that distract the jurors from the basic issues and provide a source of
error for appeal; (5) appellate courts use instructions to control the trial judge and jury; and
(6) large scale changes of local procedures are very difficult to accomplish. Green, The Submission of Issues in Negligence Cases, 18 MIAMI L. REv. 30, 32 (1963).
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The practitioners, of negligence law are divided into powerful and
professionally hostile camps neither of which would be likely to support any serious changes in current methods of the submission process. Moreover, the appellate courts which have the power and responsibility for developing and sustaining a rational process of submission, are manned by judges of too many minds, who for the most
part are too timid or are unwilling to undergo 5the extended study,
trials and tribulations of such an undertaking.'
He also might have added that bad practices are tenacious, have a
strong will to survive, possess the power of regeneration, and have
a charming way of gradually creeping back into the practice.
The major part of the tort reparations system now handled by the
judicial process could be at the edge of extinction. Petty quarrels
about the breadth or narrowness of an issue are insignificant when
compared with the powerful external forces that are working to
sweep away the whole tort system. 3"1There is probably no legislative
assembly in the nation that is not presently considering statutory
limitations upon or non-judicial alternatives to the present disposition of tort cases. In 1977 the Senate Commerce Committee of the
United States Congress by a vote of 9-7 favorably reported its "nofault" bill 21 The House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee refused to approve the corresponding House Bill by a close vote
of 22-19.111 The bills would have required state acceptance of a nofault insurance system within four years, or else an alternative state
plan would become effective under the administration of the Secretary of the Department of Transportation. 3" Additionally, on January 12, 1979, the Department of Commerce published its Draft Uniform Product Liability Law in the Federal Register and invited
345. Id. at 32-33.
346. See Combs, The Tort System: Yesterday and Today, 41 TEx. B.J. 949, 950 (1978).
The tort system, the jury system and the adversary system have been eroded in many
areas in recent times. A common example may be found in the setting up of many
federal boards and commissions which have the right to pass on complaints and controversies and whose findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive
and which the Courts have no authority to overturn.
Id. at 952; see White, The Reasonably Just Man, 5 HOUSTON L. REv. 575, 601-18 (1968). in
this article Professor White inveighs against the confusion of technical concepts that have
invaded personal injury law and suggests the grant of almost complete independence to jurors
from confining issues and instructions in reaching decisions.

347. Kircher & Maloney, Analysis of ProposedFederal "No-Fault" Legislation, 19

FOR

THE DEFENSE 135, 135 (Aug. 1978).
348. Id. at 135.

349. See S.1381, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 13,048, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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public comment.350 What the next step will be is uncertain. Already,
arbitration is being considered as an alternative to court resolution
of product liability cases."'
Strong and bold must be the efforts of those of us who believe that
the courthouse is the best place for the resolution of disputes. Those
efforts must be directed at discovering ways to expedite trials, move
dockets, and simplify the issues that jurors must answer. In the
absence of such efforts, it is very likely that the federal government
will impose its own administrative solutions upon us.
350. 44 Fed. Reg. 2996, 2997-3002 (1979).
351. See Draft Uniform Product Liability Law, 44 Fed. Reg. 2996, 3001-02 (1979); Chiet
Justice Greenhill, State of Judiciary Address, TEx. H.R.J. 264, 270 (1979); Coulson, Texas
Arbitration-ModernMachinery StandingIdle, 25 Sw. L.J. 290, 291 (1971); cf. L.H. Lacy Co.
v. City of Lubbock, 559 S.W.2d 348, 351-52 (Tex. 1977) (contractualarbitration agreement).
The 66th Legislature amended article 224 and added article 224-1 to the Texas General
Arbitration Act. See 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch 704, § 1-3, at 1708-09 (Vernon). Effective
upon August 27, 1979, the amendments remove the requirement that written agreements to
arbitrate controversies may be concluded only with the concurrence of counsel of both parties,
except for certain contracts in which the amount concerned is $50,000 or less, or in claims
for personal injury. A court may refuse to enforce an arbitration clause in a contract if found
unconscionable, and a conspicuous notice of an arbitration clause must appear on the first
page of a contract.
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